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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Although we typically think of corporations as creatures of state 
law, many corporations are chartered by the federal government. The 
Constitution does not expressly authorize the creation of corporations 
under federal law, but federally chartered corporations have existed 
since the earliest days of our country.1 Some are owned in whole or in 
substantial part by the federal government and perform what we 
think of as governmental or public functions.2 Others are nonprofits 
that perform charitable or civic functions.3 Still others, though, are 
owned by private investors and conduct business activities similar to 
                                                                                                                    
?. Visiting Professor, Charleston School of Law. B.S. 1981, Florida State University; 
J.D. 1985, Florida State University College of Law; LL.M. 1991, Yale Law School. This Ar-
ticle is dedicated to the memory of the Honorable Paul H. Roney and Sally Eustis Roney. 
 1. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing debate regarding federal 
chartering authority at constitutional convention and creation of the first and second 
Banks of the United States).  
 2. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA) are two familiar examples of the many such government corporations. See 
infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
 3. Over ninety charitable and civic organizations are chartered by federal statute, 
including the American Legion, the American National Red Cross, and Little League 
Baseball, Inc. See infra notes 45, 143-49 and accompanying text. 
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those of state-chartered business corporations.4 The number and 
types of such federally chartered business corporations continue to 
grow, with several recent proposals for new types of federal charter-
ing authority.5
 In spite of their functional similarity to state-chartered corpora-
tions, federal corporations6 differ from state corporations in one im-
portant respect: their ability to gain access to federal court. Contrary 
to what one might expect, many federal corporations actually receive 
less favorable jurisdictional treatment than do their state counterparts. 
 At one point, all federally chartered corporations enjoyed pre-
ferred access to federal court; they could sue or be sued there simply 
on the basis of their federal status.7 Early in the twentieth century, 
however, Congress eliminated this automatic basis for federal juris-
diction for most federal companies.8
 Congress did provide for state citizenship for national banks,9 but 
Congress did not address whether other types of federal corporations 
could qualify for federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizen-
ship, as their state counterparts could. Thus, the courts were left to 
determine when, if ever, a federal corporation could be considered a 
“citizen” of a particular state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 
 An early decision from the Supreme Court—indeed, the only Su-
preme Court decision to address this issue—stated unequivocally 
that a corporation chartered under federal law would be considered a 
national citizen only, not a citizen of a particular state, and therefore 
would be ineligible for diversity jurisdiction.10 Early decisions of the 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Congress has chartered railroads, construction companies, banks, savings associa-
tions, and credit unions, among others. See infra notes 31-33, 46 and accompanying text. 
 5. Recently, for example, there has been extensive discussion of optional federal 
chartering of insurance companies and agents, and legislation has been introduced that 
would create such federal chartering authority. Recent proposals also have been made for 
federal chartering of securities firms and “universal financial service” firms. See infra
notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
 6. In this Article, I use the terms “federally chartered corporations” and “federal cor-
porations” interchangeably to refer to corporations chartered under the authority of federal 
law. Similarly, I use the terms “state-chartered corporations” and “state corporations” in-
terchangeably to refer to corporations chartered under state law. 
 7. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. A federal corporation still can 
qualify for automatic federal question jurisdiction if the United States owns more than fif-
ty percent of the corporation’s capital stock. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006); see also infra
notes 105, 109 and accompanying text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1349). There also are scat-
tered federal statutes that allow particular federal corporations to invoke federal court ju-
risdiction based simply on the corporation’s federal charter. See infra notes 110-14 and ac-
companying text. 
 9. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. More recently, Congress has provided 
for state citizenship for federal savings associations and for other select categories of fed-
eral corporations. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text (discussing Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295 (1916)). 
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lower federal courts followed suit.11 Eventually, however, some courts 
began to recognize a “localization” exception: a federally chartered 
corporation would be regarded as a citizen of a particular state if its 
activities were “localized” in that state.12 This exception is now well 
established, but there continues to be wide disagreement among the 
courts as to how broadly it should be applied—in other words, as to 
when the activities of a federal corporation are sufficiently “localized” 
to allow it to be considered a state citizen. Some courts have applied 
the exception only when a corporation’s activities are limited to a 
single state,13 while others have expanded the exception to apply to 
corporations conducting activities that extend to several states but 
that are most heavily concentrated in one state.14 No matter how 
broadly the exception is applied, however, there are many circums-
tances in which a case involving a state corporation would qualify for 
diversity jurisdiction while a factually identical case involving a fed-
eral corporation would not.15
 Moreover, even when Congress has stepped in and provided for 
state citizenship for certain types of federal corporations (most nota-
bly, national banks and federal savings associations), these statutes 
have created new disparities between federal corporations and their 
state counterparts.16 The statutes have also led to a wide disparity 
between the jurisdictional treatment of federal corporations that are 
covered by the statutes and those that are not.17
 This Article explores how the current jurisdictional disparities 
arose and the extent of those disparities as they exist today. It begins 
in Part II with a brief overview of federal chartering of corporations. 
Part III then summarizes the jurisdictional treatment that state-
chartered corporations receive in federal court. Part IV examines the 
historical development of federal jurisdiction in cases involving fed-
erally chartered corporations and the current state of the law in that 
area. Part V summarizes and illustrates how the jurisdictional 
treatment of state and federal corporations differs under current law 
as well as the widely differing treatment that federal law itself 
grants to varying types of federal corporations.  
                                                                                                                    
 11. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B.3.  
 15. For example, no court has applied the localization exception to a federal corpora-
tion that operates nationwide; such a federal corporation has no state citizenship under the 
most expansive view of the localization exception. In contrast, a state corporation that op-
erates nationwide would qualify for diversity jurisdiction as a citizen of the state in which 
it is incorporated and of the state of its principal place of business. For further discussion 
of this and other examples, see infra Part V. 
 16. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 232, 242-47 and accompanying text. 
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 Part VI offers a critical perspective on the current state of the law 
and a proposal for congressional action to address the current dispar-
ities and inequities in the law. First, I argue that federal corpora-
tions—and particularly federal business corporations18—should be on 
equal jurisdictional footing with their state counterparts. There is no 
reason that federal business corporations should receive preferred 
access to diversity jurisdiction. But there is also no reason a federal 
business corporation should be denied the ability to invoke diversity 
jurisdiction when a state corporation would have that ability. Under 
the current law, this situation results when a federal corporation is 
unable to invoke the localization exception because of the geographi-
cal scope of its activities. I also argue, however, that courts should 
not take it upon themselves to bring about jurisdictional parity. It is 
questionable whether the courts should have recognized a localiza-
tion rule in the first place; arguably, the fact that Congress provided 
for state citizenship for some federal corporations, but not for others, 
should have counseled against the judicial creation of a rule that 
would recognize such citizenship. But even if it was proper for the 
courts to create the localization rule, a variety of prudential consid-
erations should lead the courts to apply the rule restrictively. 
 Therefore, I conclude that the best way to achieve the desirable 
parity is for Congress to adopt a single statute defining the citizen-
ship of all federal business corporations.19 Although such a statute 
would not eliminate all interpretative issues, it would go a long way 
toward reducing the ambiguities and disparities existing under the 
current legal patchwork. 
II.   FEDERAL CHARTERING OF CORPORATIONS
 Although the majority of American corporations are chartered un-
der state law, a significant number of corporations are chartered by 
                                                                                                                    
 18. This Article deals primarily with the jurisdictional treatment of federal business 
corporations, although it also addresses government corporations. It is not necessary, and 
probably not possible, to draw a bright dividing line between these two types of federal 
corporations. By “government corporations,” however, I refer generally to corporations that 
serve functions similar to a governmental agency and over which the government exercises 
some degree of direct control, either through full or partial ownership of the corporation’s 
stock, through appointment of some or all of its directors, or through appropriations. “Fed-
eral business corporations,” in contrast, refer to those federally chartered corporations that 
are owned and operated entirely in the private sector and that compete directly in the 
marketplace against similar state-chartered corporations. 
 19. My proposal is to add a new sentence to 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006), which would 
provide as follows: “For purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, a corporation incorpo-
rated by or under an Act of Congress shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which its 
main office is located and of the State in which it has its principal place of business.” See
infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
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the federal government.20 The first federally chartered corporations 
were banking corporations. The very first, the Bank of North Ameri-
ca, was created in 1781, while the Articles of Confederation still were 
in effect.21 Soon after the Constitution was ratified, Congress char-
tered the first Bank of the United States,22 which later was succeeded 
by the second Bank of the United States.23
 Although the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant Congress 
the power to create corporations,24 that power was validated by the 
                                                                                                                    
 20. See generally 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations §§ 93-109 (2001) (discussing 
federal corporations); 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 2.11 (2d ed. 2003) (same); 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 69.10, 92 (perm. ed., rev. vol.  
2002) (same).  
 21. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 543, 547 n.9 (noting that the Superintendent of Finance purchased about sixty per-
cent of the bank’s stock); see also Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Juri-
sprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 410-11 (discussing the views 
of James Wilson, James Madison, and others as to the power of the confederation congress 
to charter the Bank).  
 22. The first Bank was created in 1791 at the urging of Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Hamilton for the purpose of establishing credit and to assist in the country’s economic de-
velopment. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing history of first Bank). The legislation authorized the federal government to 
subscribe twenty percent of the Bank’s stock. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 
U.S. 374, 386 (1995) (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 191, 196). The legisla-
tion was enacted over the opposition of agrarian interests and the constitutional objections 
of then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. See MALLOY, supra, at 3-4. The first Bank ex-
isted until 1811, when its charter was not renewed; by then, “Jefferson’s party was in pow-
er, and there was no hope for renewal of the charter.” Id. at 4. 
 23. The second Bank was chartered in 1816. MALLOY, supra note 22, at 5. The num-
ber of state-chartered banks had grown substantially during the existence of the first Bank 
of the United States. Id. at 4. At first, the state banks were relatively stable, with few fail-
ures. Id. But, “[f]rom 1809 through the War of 1812, state banks—overextended, inexpe-
rienced and undercapitalized—frequently failed. The war left U.S. commercial and finan-
cial sectors in disarray. Even within Jefferson’s party, support emerged for a central bank 
to stabilize the economy.” Id. at 4-5. The legislation required the United States to subscribe 
to twenty percent of the second Bank’s stock and the President was to appoint five of the 
Bank’s twenty-five directors. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386-87 (citing Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 
ch. 44, §§ 1, 8, 3 Stat. 266, 266, 269). The second Bank, however, encountered immediate 
opposition from state banks, agrarian interests, and others, and it was also not renewed 
when its charter expired in 1836. See MALLOY, supra note 22, at 5, 7-8 (describing opposi-
tion to the second Bank and President Andrew Jackson’s veto of rechartering bill). 
 24. Federal chartering received at least brief consideration during the constitutional 
convention, however. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activ-
ity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 933, 944 n.19 (1952); Mark, supra note 21, at 412. There was an Incorporation Com-
mittee, but apparently it did little. See id. When Benjamin Franklin proposed that the fed-
eral government be granted the power to cut canals, James Madison moved that an 
amendment be made to provide the power “ ‘to grant charters of incorporation where the 
interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of the individual States may 
be incompetent.’ ” Id. (quoting DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE 
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 724 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927)). Rufus King, chair of 
the Incorporation Committee, argued that the proposed power was “ ‘unnecessary’ ” and 
that the states “ ‘will be prejudiced and divided into parties.’ ” Id. (quoting DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, supra, at 724). 
322 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:317 
Supreme Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland,25 where the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the second Bank.26 Federal chartering 
was proper, in the Court’s view, when it could be deemed “necessary 
and proper”27 to the exercise of one of the powers expressly granted to 
Congress under Article I of the Constitution.28
 Despite these initial forays and McCulloch’s “invitation to Con-
gress to act,”29 Congress used its chartering powers sparingly during 
the years leading up to the Civil War. The number of corporations 
chartered by state governments, though, grew at an explosive rate 
during this period.30
 Congress reasserted its chartering authority in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, however. The federal corporations authorized 
during this period—which included national banks31 and a num- 
                                                                                                                    
The proposed amendment failed, by a vote of three states in favor and eight against. Id.
Professor Mark concludes, though, that the “refusal to include the power in the Constitu-
tion was grounded not in a deeply considered and informed debate, but rather in quite the 
opposite—inaction by those charged to consider the matter and an (apparently) abbre-
viated exchange of views.” Id. at 416. He also points out that few early state constitutions 
explicitly mentioned a power to create corporations. Id. at 411. 
 25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 26. Id. at 356-60 (holding that it was constitutional for Congress to create the second 
Bank and unconstitutional for a state to tax the Bank). 
 27. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with the power “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 28. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422-23; see also Froomkin, supra note 21, at 551-
52 (discussing the holding of McCulloch). The Court has since upheld the chartering of fed-
eral corporations in many contexts. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 
288 (1936) (upholding creation of TVA); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 
180, 210 (1921) (upholding creation of Federal Land Banks system); Luxton v. N. River 
Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 534 (1894) (upholding federal corporation created to build bridge 
across Hudson River); California v. Cent. Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1888) (upholding 
federal chartering of railroad corporation); Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 
U.S. 29, 32 (1875) (upholding constitutionality of National Bank Act).  
 29. Mark, supra note 21, at 422 n.63. 
 30. Professor Mark argues that our current system of corporate federalism—in which 
state governments dominate the chartering of corporations and compete for those char-
ters—was not an inevitable outgrowth of the nation’s constitutional structure, but rather 
“seems almost to be a product of sheer accident.” Id. at 405-06; see also id. at 407 (“Con-
gress never assumed its potential role in corporate law . . . .”). 
 31. Congress first authorized the creation of national banks in 1863, at the height of 
the Civil War. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, amended by Act of June 3, 1864, 
ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. The National Bank Act was the first general corporation act enacted 
by Congress. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 20, § 2.11, at 107. “The federal government 
first tried to finance the war through U.S. notes that were issued without the benefit of a 
national banking mechanism.” Paul E. Lund, National Banks and Diversity Jurisdiction,
46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 73, 77 (2007) (discussing history of national banks). Treasury 
Secretary Samuel P. Chase, however, recommended that Congress authorize a system of 
federally chartered banks, which would have the power to issue bank notes secured by 
government bonds. Id. Congress adopted Secretary Chase’s recommendation in the 1863 
Act and authorized a newly-created officer, the Comptroller of the Currency, to issue na-
tional bank charters. Id.
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ber of railroad companies32—largely consisted of private business 
corporations that were created to assist in the nation’s expansion and 
economic development.33
 The twentieth century witnessed expansive growth both in the 
number of federally chartered corporations and in the government’s 
ownership and control of such corporations.34 Government-controlled 
corporations were used extensively during the First World War.35
Another “more enduring” group of government corporations were 
created during the Great Depression and the New Deal.36 Congress 
even authorized a federal corporation, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, to create other government corporations without further 
congressional authorization.37 With nearly sixty in existence by 1945, 
government corporations “had gotten out of hand, in both their num-
ber and their lack of accountability.”38 Congress responded by enact-
ing the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945,39 which placed 
                                                                                                                    
 32. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 387 (1995) (discussing 
federal chartering of railroad corporations). These railroads were, for the most part, estab-
lished as private corporations; the President, though, appointed two directors of the Union 
Pacific Railroad. See id. 
 33. See 1A FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 92, at 89 (discussing federal chartering of “cor-
porations for the purposes of constructing and maintaining railroads, or otherwise facilitat-
ing interstate commerce; operating telegraph lines; constructing and maintaining bridges 
over rivers forming the boundaries between states; and constructing highways from state 
to state” (citations omitted)).  
 34. The government’s first experience with control of a corporation occurred in 1902, 
when Congress authorized the President to purchase the assets of a company involved in 
the construction of the Panama Canal. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 387-88 (discussing how the fed-
eral government became the sole shareholder of Panama Railroad Company, a New  
York corporation). 
 35. See id. at 388 (discussing the War Finance Corporation, the United States Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation, and the United States Grain Corporation, among others). These 
corporations were dissolved after the war. Id. 
 36. Id. “These were primarily directed to stabilizing the economy and to making dis-
tress loans to farms, homeowners, banks, and other enterprises.” Id. (discussing, as exam-
ples, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion). Also created during this period was the Tennessee Valley Authority, which “brought 
the Government into the commercial sale of goods and services.” Id. “These public corpora-
tions conducted quasi-governmental functions, but they had somewhat greater autonomy 
than ordinary government bureaus or agencies.” 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 20, § 2.11,  
at 107.  
 37. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 388-89. Among the federal corporations created by the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation were the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Petroleum Re-
serves Corporation, the War Damage Corporation, the Rubber Development Corporation, 
and the Defense Plant Corporation. Id. at 389. Some federal corporations and agencies also 
proceeded to organize other corporations under state law, without specific authorization to 
do so. Id. (discussing Defense Homes Corporation, a Maryland corporation formed by the 
Secretary of Treasury, and Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives, a Tennessee corpo-
ration formed by TVA).  
 38. Id.
 39. Government Corporation Control Act, Pub L. No. 79-248, 59 Stat. 597 (1945) (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9110 (2006)). 
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new controls on corporations both wholly owned and partially owned 
by the government.40
 Few government corporations were created in the immediate 
postwar years, but during the 1960s “the allure of the corporate form 
was felt again, and new entities proliferated.”41 Although many of 
these “followed the traditional model, often explicitly designated as 
[federal] agencies and located within the existing Governmental 
structure,” others took new forms.42 A number of these new corpora-
tions purported to be “private” corporations, and their congressional 
charters explicitly stated that they were not agencies or instrumen-
talities of the United States.43 Among the new government corpora-
tions created during this period were the highly controversial Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), including Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.44 Though purportedly private entities, these  
corporations were formed to perform governmental or quasi-
governmental functions. 
 In addition to these numerous and varied government corpora-
tions, Congress has chartered quite a few nonprofit, charitable corpo-
rations. Title 36 of the U.S. Code contains the corporate charters of 
over ninety patriotic and national societies.45
 Congress has also continued to expand the authorization of fed-
eral chartering of private business corporations. In addition to the 
                                                                                                                    
 40. The Act also prohibited the creation of new government corporations without spe-
cific congressional authorization. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390. The Act resulted in the dissolu-
tion of a number of government corporations, and few government corporations were 
formed between 1945 and the 1960s. See id.
 41. Id.
 42. Id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 9101 (listing “wholly owned Government corporation[s]” 
and “mixed-ownership Government corporation[s]”); 91 C.J.S. United States §§ 83-95 
(2000) (discussing government owned or controlled corporations). 
 43. See 1A FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 69.10, at 4 (“To avoid the controls of the [Gov-
ernment Corporation Control Act of 1945], the government began creating corporations 
that were capitalized entirely by private funds and controlled by private shareholders, in 
an attempt to have these corporations not classified as agencies or establishments of the 
United States.”); see also Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390-91 (discussing Communications Satellite 
Corporation (Comsat), Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and Legal Services Corporation). 
 44. For discussion and critique of GSEs, see Froomkin, supra note 21. The number of 
GSEs is somewhat unclear. The statutes governing GSEs, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4651 (2006), 
apply only to the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Professor 
Froomkin, writing in 1995, identified eleven federal corporations he believed qualified as 
GSEs. See Froomkin, supra note 21, at 555-57. At least one corporation he listed, the Stu-
dent Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), has been privatized and now is a state-
chartered corporation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (2006) (codifying the privatization legisla-
tion); Debra Bruno, Working to Support Education Financing, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 11, 2005, at 
8 (describing the privatization process). 
 45. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 10101-240112 (2006). They include well-known entities such as 
the Boy Scouts of America, the Girl Scouts of America, and the U.S. Olympic Committee. 
See also infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction over cases in-
volving federally chartered charitable corporations). 
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national banks, railroads, and other corporations authorized in early 
years, Congress has given statutory authorization for the federal 
chartering of savings associations, credit unions, and various other 
entities.46 Currently, there is a great deal of discussion regarding the 
federal chartering of insurance companies and agencies, and legisla-
tion to provide for such chartering has been introduced in both hous-
es.47 Proposals have also been made to authorize federal chartering of 
securities firms and of “universal financial service” firms.48 All of 
these chartering statutes have been enacted or proposed with some 
sort of “national” goal in mind, but the resulting business corpora-
tions are functionally identical to the comparable state corporations 
with which they compete for business and investment.49
 Because federal business corporations are creatures of federal 
law, certain issues regarding their corporate powers and duties are 
governed by federal law.50 For the most part, however, federal busi-
ness corporations are subject to the general laws—tort, contract, and 
otherwise—in the states in which they conduct business.51
                                                                                                                    
 46. “Congress, if it so desires, arguably can extend federal chartering power to all cor-
porations engaging in interstate commerce.” 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 20, § 2.11, at 107. 
A number of commentators have advocated federal chartering of all large corporations, 
with many arguing that federal chartering would lead to better and more uniform regula-
tion of corporations. See id. at 107 & n.3 (citing articles by several commentators). But see 
id. at 107-08 (arguing federal chartering of large corporations is unnecessary to achieve 
regulatory goals). 
 47. National Insurance Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1880, 111th Cong. (2009); Na-
tional Insurance Act of 2007, H.R. 3200, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 40, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 48. A commission of the Financial Services Roundtable has recommended three new 
types of federal chartering authority: the optional federal insurance charter, a similar op-
tion for securities firms, and a new type of charter for “universal financial service” firms 
(also known as universal banks). See RICHARD M. KOVACEVICH ET AL., FINANCIAL SERVICES
ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS 113-28 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.fsround.org/cec/pdfs/FINALCompetitivenessReport.pdf. A universal fi-
nancial service firm “would be permitted to engage in any financial activity, including 
banking, securities, and insurance activities.” Id. at 127. 
 49. National banks, for example, serve both public and private purposes, but they are 
“organized by private persons pursuant to federal law and operated for private gain.” 9 
C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 514, at 460 (1996). 
 50. See Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see also infra notes 80-
93 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1997) (discussing past decisions 
by Supreme Court that found “numerous” state laws apply to national banks); 36 AM. JUR.
2D Foreign Corporations § 106 (2001) (discussing general amenability of federal corpora-
tions to state law). In Atherton, the Court quoted from its opinion in First National Bank v. 
Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870), where the Court had stated that national banks  
are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of 
business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their con-
tracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer 
of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for 
debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates 
the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes un-
constitutional. 
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 This Article will, to an extent, discuss the jurisdictional rules ap-
plicable to all federally chartered corporations, including both gov-
ernment corporations and private business corporations. The prima-
ry focus, though, will be on federally chartered business corporations 
and their jurisdictional status relative to state-chartered business 
corporations. 
III.   FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND STATE-CHARTERED CORPORATIONS
 A state-chartered corporation that wishes to bring a lawsuit in 
federal court (or a corporation defending a state court suit that would 
like to remove the suit to federal court) is usually limited to one of 
two options. The first is to attempt to invoke so-called “federal ques-
tion jurisdiction”52 by demonstrating that the particular suit is one 
that arises under federal law. Typically this involves showing that 
the plaintiff has asserted a claim that is created by federal law or 
that turns upon the resolution of a substantial federal issue.53 Failing 
this, the second option is to attempt to invoke federal jurisdiction on 
the basis that the suit involves parties who are citizens of different 
states—so-called “diversity jurisdiction.”54
 In America’s earliest years, corporations were completely forec-
losed from invoking diversity jurisdiction.55 Congress, when it first 
                                                                                                                    
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 223. See generally Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law,
76 B.U. L. REV. 895 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to create rules of 
federal common law to displace state law). 
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that federal judicial power “shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2006) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). 
 53. For a general discussion of the requirements that must be met before federal 
question jurisdiction may be invoked, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
282-96 (5th ed. 2007).  
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that federal “judicial Power shall extend 
. . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) 
(providing for district court jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different 
States”). For a general discussion of the requirements that must be met before diversity ju-
risdiction may be invoked, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 130-32. For a discussion of 
the purposes behind diversity jurisdiction, see infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text. 
 55. For general discussions of diversity jurisdiction as applied to state-chartered cor-
porations, see 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.56[4] (Daniel R. 
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 3623 (2d ed. 1984); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS 165-73 (6th ed. 2002); Charles Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Ci-
tizenship, 19 VA. L. REV. 661 (1933). For an interesting dialogue on whether diversity ju-
risdiction should be available to corporations, compare James W. Moore & Donald T. 
Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fic-
tion Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1426 (1964), which argues in favor, with Dudley O. 
McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction 
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authorized diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789,56 made 
no provision regarding the citizenship of corporations. This congres-
sional silence is not very surprising as the type of business corpora-
tion that proliferates today was largely unknown at the time of our 
country’s founding. Very few private corporations existed at that 
time—by some estimates, fewer than ten corporations existed in 
178957—and those that did exist were mostly local in nature.58 Corpo-
rations were created by individual acts of legislation; the type of 
state corporate codes with which we are familiar today did not ap-
pear until later.59
 The Supreme Court first addressed the citizenship of a corpora-
tion in its 1809 decision in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.60
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that a corpora-
tion is a “mere legal entity” that could not itself be considered to have 
citizenship.61 Therefore, in his view, the citizenship of each of the 
corporation’s shareholders would have to be taken into account,62 and 
diversity jurisdiction would exist only when none of the corporation’s 
shareholders was a citizen of the same state as any opposing party.63
                                                                                                                    
of the Federal Courts (pts. 1-3), 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943), which  
argues against. 
 56. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 57. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 165 (“When the Constitution was adopted, 
the private corporation was virtually unknown.”). The exact number of corporations that 
existed at the time of the Constitution’s ratification is unclear, although the number is 
small by any account. Some have claimed the number was as small as six. See Berle, supra
note 24, at 945 n.22. Another author, though, reports that thirty-three charters were is-
sued to business corporations during the period from 1781 to 1790. Mark, supra note 21,  
at 410. 
 58. See Mark, supra note 21, at 413 (corporations formed during country’s early years 
“were essentially local”). 
 59. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 21 (2000) (noting that although 
“New York enacted the first general incorporation statute in 1811, . . . it took decades be-
fore these statutes supplanted special chartering”).  
 60. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). This case involved the first Bank of the United 
States. Georgia had enacted a statute that purported to tax the Bank. Id. at 63. The Bank 
filed a federal court action against two Georgia officials, claiming that the officers had 
trespassed on the Bank’s property in an attempt to collect the tax monies allegedly owed to 
the state. Id. The federal chartering statute provided the Bank had the power “ ‘to sue and 
be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in 
courts of record, or any other place whatsoever.’ ” Id. at 85 (quoting incorporating act). 
Chief Justice Marshall first addressed whether this statute conferred a right on the Bank 
to sue in federal court. Id. at 85-86. He concluded the statute did not confer jurisdiction, 
but simply spoke of the Bank’s general capacity to sue and be sued. See id. at 86. His con-
clusion on this issue led to his discussion of the second issue: whether the Bank could bring 
suit in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See id. at 86-92. 
 61. Id. at 86. 
 62. Id. at 91-92. 
 63. Although the Constitution does not require complete diversity of citizenship, the 
Supreme Court long ago interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) and its predecessors to re-
quire complete diversity. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). For the 
complete diversity requirement to be satisfied, no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same 
state as any defendant. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 302-03. 
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 Today, the Deveaux rule would mean that very few suits involving 
corporations could qualify for diversity jurisdiction, but at the time, 
it did not cause as great a problem because most corporations were 
locally owned.64 As the number and scope of private corporations in-
creased in the years after Deveaux, however, pressure mounted to al-
low suits involving corporations to be heard in federal court.65 The 
Deveaux rule remained the prevailing rule until 1844, when the 
Court reversed course in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Rail-
road v. Letson.66 There, the Court held that a state-chartered corpo-
ration was entitled to be treated as a citizen of the state in which it 
was incorporated.67
 A few years later, the Court again reversed course—at least 
somewhat—in its 1853 decision in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co.68 The Court in Marshall readopted Justice Marshall’s 
view that a corporation cannot have citizenship and that the citizen-
ship of its shareholders therefore must be controlling.69 But the Mar-
shall Court also adopted a conclusive presumption that all of the cor-
poration’s shareholders were citizens of the state in which it was in-
corporated.70 The Marshall rule thus reached the same result as Let-
son but through a different rationale. 
                                                                                                                    
 64. See Mark, supra note 21, at 433-34. 
 65. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3623, at 590; see also Louisville, Cincin-
nati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) (“[T]he cases of Straw-
bridge and Curtis [sic] and the Bank and Deveaux have never been satisfactory to the bar, 
and . . . they were not, especially the last, entirely satisfactory to the court that made 
them.”). One author has argued that it was not corporations who were seeking access to 
federal court in these early cases, but rather individual citizens who “apprehended preju-
dice in favor of the State corporation.” Warren, supra note 55, at 670. It was not until the 
1870s, when anticorporate sentiment began to take hold, that some corporations sought re-
fuge in federal court. See id. at 672-73. 
 66. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). 
 67. Id. at 555 (“A corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the au-
thority of that state and only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, 
seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, 
and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of 
that state.”). 
 68. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). Marshall, a citizen of Virginia, sued the railroad to 
recover a sum of money allegedly owed to him for services performed. The suit alleged that 
the railroad had been incorporated by the State of Maryland. Id. at 314. 
 69. See id. at 327-28. 
 70. Id. at 329; see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3623, at 591 (discussing 
Marshall’s conclusive presumption). Later cases reaffirmed that the Marshall presumption 
could not be rebutted by contrary evidence. See id. at 591-92. 
 The Marshall presumption also applies to non-U.S. corporations; the stockholders of 
such a corporation are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the country in which the 
corporation is chartered. Id. at 592. The presumption does not extend, however, to unin-
corporated business associations, whether U.S. or foreign. Id. at 597. Thus, for  
partnerships, unions, and other unincorporated associations, the citizenship of each mem-
ber of the association must be taken into account in determining whether jurisdiction ex-
ists based on diversity of citizenship. Id.; see also id. § 3630 (discussing citizenship of unin-
corporated associations). 
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 The Marshall presumption “was of doubtful accuracy in 1854 and 
. . . is totally unwarranted today,”71 but the Marshall “fiction” was “a 
compromise destined to endure for over a century.”72 The Marshall
rule soon came under attack, and numerous unsuccessful bills were 
introduced in Congress over the years to either limit or eliminate 
corporations’ ability to gain access to federal court through  
diversity jurisdiction.73
 Eventually, Congress amended the Marshall rule in 1958 when it 
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Section 1332(c)(1) codified the Mar-
shall result by providing that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a 
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated.”74 The new 
law provided, however, that a corporation would also be deemed a 
citizen “of the State where it has its principal place of business.”75
The statute was intended partly to reduce the caseload of the federal 
courts but also “to remedy the abuse caused when an entirely local 
corporation was able to invoke diversity jurisdiction merely because 
it had been incorporated in another state.”76
 Thus, under current law, a state-chartered corporation is at most 
a citizen of two states: the state in which it is incorporated and, if dif-
ferent, the state in which it maintains its principal place of busi-
ness.77 Often a federal court is called upon to resolve uncertainty as 
to where the corporation’s “principal place of business” is located,78
but every state corporation ultimately has only one principal place of 
                                                                                                                    
 71. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3623, at 602. 
 72. United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 148 (1965). 
 73. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3623, at 602-03 & n.46 (summarizing legisla-
tive proposals); Warren, supra note 55, at 673-84 (discussing extensively legislative pro-
posals in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). One such proposal would have 
“provided that a corporation be deemed a citizen of any state in which it carried on busi-
ness for the purpose of suits with residents arising out of that business.” 13B WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 55, § 3623, at 602 n.46 (discussing proposal by American Law Institute). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006). The provision regarding corporate citizenship origi-
nally was numbered § 1332(c), but it was renumbered as § 1332(c)(1) when a new subsec-
tion, relating to legal representatives, was added to the statute in 1988. Judicial Improve-
ments and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 202(a), 102 Stat 4642, 4646 (1988). 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). An earlier version of the proposal would have provided that 
a corporation be deemed “a citizen of any state from which it derived more than half its 
gross income.” 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3624, at 605. 
 76. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3624, at 607-08; see also id. at 608 (“Since the 
underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is to protect out-of-state resi-
dents from the prejudice of local state courts, it was an anomaly to allow corporations that 
in effect were local businesses to invoke federal jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). 
 77. Some ambiguity arises if the corporation is incorporated in more than one state. 
Some courts have treated such a corporation as a citizen of each state in which it is incor-
porated, while other courts, following the so-called “forum doctrine,” have treated such a 
corporation as being incorporated only in the forum state. See id. § 3626. 
 78. See id. § 3625, at 618-44 (discussing various approaches used to determine  
corporation’s “principal place of business,” including the “nerve center” and “total  
activity” tests). 
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business.79 This is true not only of small, locally operated corpora-
tions but also of large corporations that conduct activities nationwide 
or worldwide. 
IV.   THE JURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT OF FEDERALLY
CHARTERED CORPORATIONS
A.   Federal Question Jurisdiction and Federally  
Chartered Corporations 
 At one point, federally chartered corporations enjoyed far greater 
access to federal court than their state-chartered counterparts. As a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborn v. Bank of the Unit-
ed States,80 a federally chartered corporation could invoke federal ju-
risdiction in any lawsuit, simply on the basis of its federal charter. 
Osborn involved the second Bank of the United States.81 In de-
fiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland,82 the 
State of Ohio had continued to tax the Bank.83 State officials raided 
the Bank’s office in Chillicothe, Ohio, and seized over $120,000.84 The 
Bank brought suit against the state officials in federal court, seeking 
to recover the seized funds.85 Because the Bank alleged the seizure 
violated the federal Constitution,86 the Bank’s suit undoubtedly 
turned on an issue of federal law. But at the time this case arose, 
Congress had not yet provided general authorization for federal 
courts to hear cases arising under federal law; “general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction” would not be authorized until 1875.87 The Bank, 
though, claimed that a provision in its chartering statute authorized 
the federal courts to hear suits to which the Bank was a party; the 
provision granted the Bank power “ ‘to sue and be sued, plead and be 
impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in all 
State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court 
of the United States.’ ”88
                                                                                                                    
 79. Id. § 3624, at 611. 
 80. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding all suits involving the Bank of the United 
States as a party arose under federal law by virtue of the Bank’s federal charter). 
 81. Id.; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the second Bank). 
 82. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that it was constitutional for Congress to 
create the second Bank of the United States and that it was unconstitutional for a state to 
tax the Bank); see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing McCulloch  
v. Maryland). 
 83. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 276 (summarizing background of Osborn).
 84. Id.
 85. Id. Some of the funds had already been seized in a raid by federal officials on the 
state treasury. Id.
 86.  Osborn, 22 U.S. at 859-60. 
 87. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 (2006)). 
 88. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 817 (quoting chartering statute). 
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 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall addressed two 
issues: whether the charter provision authorized federal courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction in suits to which the Bank was a party and, if so, 
whether that authorization was constitutional.89 He had little trouble 
with the first issue, concluding that the statute was a clear authori-
zation for federal court jurisdiction.90 Although Justice Marshall 
could have resolved the constitutional issue on a narrow ground—the 
Bank’s suit in Osborn asserted a claim under the federal Constitu-
tion and therefore undoubtedly arose under federal law91—he chose 
to speak more broadly. He said that a case arises under federal law 
whenever federal law “forms an ingredient of the original cause.”92
Justice Marshall believed that this was true of any case to which the 
Bank was a party because in every such case there was a potential 
issue—the Bank’s capacity to sue or be sued, its capacity to enter in-
to contracts, or a similar issue—that would require interpretation 
and application of the Bank’s federal chartering statute.93 Thus, fed-
eral jurisdiction was proper simply on the basis of the Bank’s federal-
ly chartered status. 
 The full import of Osborn was made clear by the Court’s ruling in 
a companion case, Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of 
Georgia,94 in which the Court upheld jurisdiction even though the 
Bank was asserting only a state law contract claim.95 The rationale of 
Osborn and the scope of its holding have been subject to criticism by 
the Court itself,96 but the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Osborn.97
                                                                                                                    
 89. Id. at 816-19.  
 90. See id. at 817-18 (“These words seem to the Court to admit of but one interpreta-
tion. They cannot be made plainer by explanation.”). Commentators, though, long have 
questioned whether the statutory language indeed is so clear. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, su-
pra note 53, at 276 n.21 (“There is an alternative interpretation of this statutory provision: 
that the statute creates the capacity of the bank to sue or be sued, but it does not create ju-
risdiction.”); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 103 n.6 (“A more natural interpretation 
might have been that the charter gave the bank capacity to be a party to a suit but did not 
in itself create jurisdiction.”). 
 91. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 103. 
 92. Osborn, 22 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 823. 
 93. See id. at 823-28. 
 94. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824) (involving a claim to collect on state-issued notes). 
 95. Id. at 914. 
 96. See, e.g., Ass’n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 
348 U.S. 437, 451 (1955) (“Federal jurisdiction based solely on the fact of federal incorpora-
tion has, however, been severely restricted by Congress, and this Court has cast doubt on 
its continued vitality.” (citation omitted)). Other courts have also questioned Osborn. See, 
e.g., Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.3 (9th Cir. 
1974) (stating that if the issue were before the court, “we would not feel compelled to hold, 
without further analysis, that a federal question is necessarily created by the mere pres-
ence of the FSLIC as a party to this suit”). 
 97. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 264-65 (1992) (“We have con-
sistently reaffirmed the breadth of [the Osborn] holding. We would be loath to repudiate 
such a longstanding and settled rule, on which Congress has surely been entitled to rely 
. . . .” (citations omitted)); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) 
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 The Osborn case did not immediately open the federal courthouse 
door to all federal corporations, however. Osborn held only that it 
was constitutional to confer jurisdiction on the basis of the corpora-
tion’s federal charter. It was still up to Congress to actually confer 
that jurisdiction, as it had done for the Bank of the United States but 
had not generally done for other federally chartered corporations. 
 However, when Congress finally decided in 1875 to authorize gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction,98 the federal courthouse doors 
swung open. Any federally chartered corporation, whether as plain-
tiff or defendant, could opt for federal court purely on the basis of its 
federal status. This was confirmed by the Pacific Railroad Removal 
Cases,99 where the Court held that state law tort claims against  
federally chartered railroads could be removed by the railroads to 
federal court.100
 The ensuing years witnessed a “flood” of cases involving federally 
chartered corporations in the federal courts.101 Congress eventually 
acted to stem this flood. The first step, taken in 1882, was to elimi-
nate automatic federal question jurisdiction in cases involving na-
tional banks.102 This measure was intended to place national banks 
                                                                                                                    
(“Only recently we said after full consideration that the doctrine of the charter cases was to 
be treated as exceptional, though within their special field there was no thought to disturb 
them.”); Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, S.C. v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213, 214 
(1928) (citing Osborn for proposition that “[a] suit by or against a corporation created un-
der an Act of Congress is one arising under the laws of the United States”). 
 98. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1331 (2006)). 
 99. 115 U.S. 1 (1885). 
 100. See id. at 15-16; see also Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Ga., 256 U.S. 350, 356-57 (1921) (holding, based upon Osborn and Pacific Railroad Remov-
al Cases, that any suit against a federally chartered corporation arises under federal law 
and therefore is subject to removal by the corporation); In re Dunn, 212 U.S. 374, 383-84 
(1909) (holding that action against a federally chartered railroad corporation arises under 
federal law and therefore is subject to removal). 
 101. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 388 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 730, 752 (1953)); Crum v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 502 F. Supp. 1377, 
1383 (D. Del. 1980) (stating that enactment of general federal question jurisdiction, as in-
terpreted in Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, “led to a deluge of litigation which was 
stemmed by passage of section 1349”).
 102. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163. That Act provided in  
relevant part: 
[T]he jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association es-
tablished under any law providing for national-banking associations, except 
suits between them and the United States, or its officers and agents, shall be 
the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks 
not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking 
business where such national-banking associations may be doing business 
when such suits may be begun . . . .  
Id. The 1882 Act was amended five years later. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 
Stat. 552, 554-55. The 1887 Act provided in relevant part: 
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“on the same footing” as state-chartered banks.103 Later, in 1915, 
Congress acted to eliminate automatic federal question jurisdiction 
over suits involving federally chartered railroad companies.104 Final-
ly, in 1925, Congress enacted a statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1349, which eliminated automatic federal question jurisdiction for all 
other federally chartered corporations, with the exception of corpora-
tions in which the federal government owns more than fifty percent 
of the corporation’s capital stock.105
 Although § 1349 generally bars federal corporations from invoking 
federal jurisdiction based solely on their federal charter, there are a 
number of circumstances in which a federally chartered corporation 
may invoke federal question jurisdiction. First, of course, like any 
other litigant, a federally chartered corporation may attempt to dem-
onstrate that the particular case to which it is a party is one arising 
under federal law.106 Also, a “little-known”107 section of the Edge Act 
                                                                                                                    
[A]ll national banking associations established under the laws of the United 
States shall, for the purposes of all actions by or against them, real, personal or 
mixed, and all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the States in which they 
are respectively located; and in such cases the circuit and district courts shall 
not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between in-
dividual citizens of the same State.  
Id. The current version of the statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006). For the text of 
§ 1348, see infra note 220. 
 103. Leather Mfrs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887). The 1882 Act and 
its successors did not affect the ability of a national bank to invoke federal question juris-
diction, as any party may invoke federal question jurisdiction when the particular lawsuit 
involves a claim or claims that arise under federal law. See Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Memphis 
v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 124 (1903). National banks could also attempt to invoke diversity 
jurisdiction. Congress provided that a national bank would be considered a citizen of the 
state “in which [it was] located.” See supra note 102. Diversity jurisdiction over suits in-
volving national banks will be discussed infra at notes 220, 224-28 and accompanying text. 
 104. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803, 804 (“No court of the United States 
shall have jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any railroad company upon the 
ground that said railroad company was incorporated under an Act of Congress.”). 
 105. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (“[N]o district court shall have ju-
risdiction of any action or suit by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was 
incorporated by or under an Act of Congress: Provided, That this section shall not apply to 
any suit, action, or proceeding brought by or against a corporation incorporated by or un-
der an Act of Congress wherein the Government of the United States is the owner of more 
than one-half of its capital stock.”). The statute now is codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 
1349 (2006), which provides the following: “The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of 
any civil action by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorporated by 
or under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more than one-half of 
its capital stock.” 
 106. See Murphy, 388 F.2d at 611-12 (holding that the particular suit arose under fed-
eral law and therefore qualified for federal jurisdiction under § 1331). Section 1349 merely 
generaliz[ed] the earlier legislation, which had prohibited railway corporations 
from resorting to the federal courts because of a federal charter. As Mr. Justice 
Van Devanter explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill extended 
“the railroad section so as to cover any kind of Federal corporation. If there 
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of 1913 provides for federal jurisdiction in all cases “arising out of 
transactions involving international or foreign banking . . . or out of 
international or foreign financial operations” to which a federally-
chartered corporation is a party.108
 For a select group of federally chartered corporations, Congress 
has retained automatic federal question jurisdiction for all cases to 
which these corporations are parties. As noted above, § 1349 retains 
automatic federal question jurisdiction whenever the United States 
owns more than fifty percent of the corporation’s capital stock.109 A 
                                                                                                                    
happens to be some other ground for taking the case into a federal court, it can 
go there. But federal incorporation alone is not enough.” 
Id. at 612 (citation omitted) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 272 n.55 (1927)). 
 107. Thomas J. McCormack et al., Edge Act Enables National Banks to Invoke Federal 
Jurisdiction over Suits Involving International Banking or Financial Operations, 124 
BANKING L.J. 907, 907 (2007). 
 108. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006). The relevant portion of the statute provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all suits of a civil nature at com-
mon law or in equity to which any corporation organized under the laws of the 
United States shall be a party, arising out of transactions involving interna-
tional or foreign banking, or banking in a dependency or insular possession of 
the United States, or out of other international or foreign financial operations, 
either directly or through the agency, ownership, or control of branches or local 
institutions in dependencies or insular possessions of the United States or in 
foreign countries, shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, 
and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all 
such suits; and any defendant in any such suit may, at any time before the trial 
thereof, remove such suits from a State court into the district court of the Unit-
ed States for the proper district by following the procedure for the removal of 
causes otherwise provided by law.  
Id. The legislative history of § 632, which originated in 1933 as part of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, is “scant.” McCormack et al., supra note 107, at 908. However, the provision’s “legisla-
tive purpose was clearly to create federal jurisdiction over international transactions as a 
means to promote the establishment of a uniform body of law for national banks in con-
junction with the implementation of a federal system of banking regulation.” Id. For a dis-
cussion of how federal courts have interpreted § 632, see id. at 909-15.  
 109. An interesting issue arises when the corporation is one in which there is no capi-
tal stock, either because it is prohibited from issuing stock, never issued stock, or once had 
stock that since has been retired. See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 916, at 317 (2007) 
(surveying split in case law). A number of courts, relying on the literal language of § 1349, 
have held that the statute precludes such corporations from invoking federal jurisdiction 
solely on the basis of their federal charter. See, e.g., Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e hold that jurisdiction is not 
conferred over the FSLIC merely because it is a federally chartered corporation whose en-
tire stock once was owned by the United States.”); Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. 
Supp. 517, 522-24 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (involving U.S. Olympic Committee, which is prohibited 
from issuing stock); Crockett Mortgage Co. v. Gov’t Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 418 F. Supp. 
1081, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (involving Ginnie Mae, which has no capital stock). Another 
group of courts, though, have reasoned that “such blind reliance on the literal wording of 
section 1349 exalts form over substance.” Gov’t Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Terry, 608 F.2d 
614, 620 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he proviso to section 1349 was added to preserve federal 
question jurisdiction over federally-chartered corporations in which the Government has 
the controlling interest. Since control of a corporation normally follows from the ownership 
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handful of other federal corporations receive the benefit of individual 
statutes. Perhaps the most well-known example is the American Na-
tional Red Cross. In American National Red Cross v. S.G.,110 the Su-
preme Court held that the organization’s chartering statute, which 
provides the organization with power to “sue and be sued in courts of 
law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States,”111 creates original federal jurisdiction over suits involving 
the Red Cross.112 Similar language appears in the chartering statutes 
of several other federal corporations.113 Another group of similar sta-
                                                                                                                    
of a majority of the corporation’s capital stock, the congressional use of the words ‘unless 
the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock’ simply represents 
a short-hand expression for control. The fact that Congress in creating an entity like Gin-
nie Mae did not engage in the mechanical and formal process of issuing stock and then 
purchasing it does not detract from the conclusion that the Government controls Ginnie 
Mae.” (citation omitted)); see also C.H. v. Am. Red Cross, 684 F. Supp. 1018, 1020-22 (E.D. 
Mo. 1987) (concluding, after exhaustive review of legislative history of § 1349, that its pro-
viso applies to all corporations controlled by the United States); Jackson v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 462 F. Supp. 45, 51-55 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (reviewing legislative history and conclud-
ing that TVA is owned and controlled by United States even though it has no stock), aff’d,
595 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curium) (adopting district court’s opinion). 
 110. 505 U.S. 247 (1992). Red Cross was a 5-4 ruling; the dissenting justices believed 
that the statutory language was insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Id. at 265 (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting).  
 111. See 36 U.S.C. § 300105(a)(5) (2006) (current version of statute). At the time of the 
Red Cross decision, identical statutory language was codified at 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).  
 112. The majority opinion reasoned that “a congressional charter’s ‘sue and be sued’ 
provision may be read to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically men-
tions the federal courts.” Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added). The majority con-
trasted the language found in the Red Cross’s statute with the more general “sue and be 
sued” language that had been held insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction in Deveaux.
See id. at 255-56; see also supra note 60 (discussing the statutory language at issue  
in Deveaux).
 For a discussion of the Red Cross case and its potential implications for other feder-
ally chartered corporations, see Christina M. Maistrellis, Comment, American National 
Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E.: An Open Door to the Federal Courts for Federally Chartered Cor-
porations, 45 EMORY L.J. 771 (1996). 
 113. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b)(1) (2000) (providing that the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corporation has power to “sue and be sued, complain and defend . . . in any State, 
Federal, or other court”); id. § 657c(d)(4) (providing that the National Veterans Business 
Development Corporation has power to “sue and be sued, and to file and defend against 
lawsuits in State or Federal court”); 29 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (providing that the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation has power to “sue and be sued, complain and defend . . . in 
any court, State or Federal”); 42 U.S.C. § 8105(b)(4) (providing that the Neighborhood 
Reinvestment Corporation has power to “sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any 
State, Federal, or other court”). Omitted from this list are those corporations whose statu-
tory charters also include the type of “deemer” language discussed infra at note 114 and 
accompanying text. 
 A number of other statutes, although similar to the statute at issue in Red Cross, are 
phrased somewhat differently; they refer to the power to sue and be sued “in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000) (Federal 
Home Loan Banks); id. § 1723a(a) (Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae) and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)); id. § 3012(6) (National 
Consumer Cooperative Bank); 15 U.S.C. § 77dd (Corporation of Foreign Securities Hold-
ers). A few courts—reasoning that these statutes’ reference to a court of “competent” juris-
diction cannot be satisfied unless there is an independent basis for jurisdiction—have held 
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tutes provides that actions by or against certain corporations are 
“deemed to arise under” federal law and thus are within original fed-
eral jurisdiction.114
 With rare exceptions like the American National Red Cross, how-
ever, most of the statutes discussed above apply to government or 
public corporations—many of which already qualify for federal juris-
diction either under § 1349’s proviso115 or as an agency of the U.S. 
government.116 Federally chartered business corporations can no 
                                                                                                                    
that these statutes do not confer federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Knuckles v. RBMG, Inc., 481 
F. Supp. 2d 559, 562-65 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (holding that § 1723a(a) does not confer federal 
jurisdiction over actions to which Fannie Mae is a party); Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. 
Sealed, 457 F. Supp. 2d 41, 43 n.1 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing cases holding that § 1723a(a) 
does confer original jurisdiction and stating that “those courts have uniformly given the is-
sue extremely short shrift, applying American National Red Cross in mechanical and per-
functory fashion or merely stating, conclusorily and without any analysis, that Section 
1723a(a) operates as a grant of jurisdiction”). But see Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree 
Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 784-88 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (adopting “majority” 
view that § 1723a(a) confers original jurisdiction; disagreeing with Knuckles and Sealed).
 The newest corporation to receive the benefit of statutory language that should
prove sufficient under Red Cross is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), which was created in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 
7211(f)(1) (2006) (providing PCAOB may “complain and defend, in its corporate name and 
through its own counsel, . . . in any Federal, State, or other court”). The statute provides 
that PCAOB shall “operate as a nonprofit corporation,” id. § 7211(a), and that it “shall not 
be an agency or establishment of the United States Government, and, except as otherwise 
provided in this Act, shall be subject to, and have all the powers conferred upon a nonprofit 
corporation by, the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act,” id. § 7211(b). For a 
discussion of PCOAB and a critique of its purported “private” status, see Donna M. Nagy, 
Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005). But see Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting Appointments Clause and separation of powers challenges to PCAOB), 
cert. granted 77 U.S.L.W 3632 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861). 
 114. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006) (any suit to which a Federal Reserve Bank is a 
party); id. § 1441a(a)(11) (any suit to which Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board is 
a party); id. § 1441a(l)(1) (any suit to which Resolution Trust Corporation is a party); id. § 
1441b(h)(4)(A) (any suit to which Resolution Funding Corporation is a party); id. § 1452(f) 
(any suit to which Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) is a party); id.
§ 1819(b)(2) (suits to which FDIC is a party, with certain exceptions); id. § 2277a-7(4)(b) 
(any suit to which Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation is a party); id. § 2278a-3(b) 
(any suit to which Farm Credit System Assistance Board is a party); id. § 2278b-4(b) (any 
suit to which Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation is a party); id. § 
2279aa-14(2) (any suit to which Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation is a party);  see 
also 7 U.S.C. § 1506(d) (2006) (providing that federal district courts have exclusive juris-
diction over all suits brought by or against the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation); 15 
U.S.C. § 146a (same as to all suits brought by or against any China Trade Act corporation); 
id. § 714b(c) (same as to all suits brought by or against the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion); 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9) (providing that federal district courts have original jurisdic-
tion over suits removed to federal court by the U.S. Olympic Committee). 
 115. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings com-
menced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to 
sue by Act of Congress.”); see also id. § 1346 (actions against United States); id. § 1442 
(removal of actions against agencies of United States and employees of such agencies). A 
number of federal corporate chartering statutes expressly provide that the corporation will 
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longer invoke federal jurisdiction simply on the basis of their federal 
charter alone. 
B.   Diversity Jurisdiction and Federally Chartered Corporations 
1.   Congressional Silence and the Bankers Trust Decision 
 Federally chartered corporations that do not enjoy the blessing of 
automatic federal question jurisdiction have two possible paths to 
federal court. Such a corporation may attempt to demonstrate that 
the particular suit to which it is a party arises under federal law. Or, 
it may attempt to argue that jurisdiction exists on the basis of diver-
sity of citizenship.117
 If the federally chartered corporation seeking diversity jurisdic-
tion is one of a select group, it may be in luck. In various federal sta-
tutes, Congress has provided that certain types of federal corpora-
tions (most notably, national banks118 and federal savings associa-
tions119) are deemed to be citizens of designated states for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction. These statutes will be discussed in Part. IV.B.5. 
 But if the federally chartered corporation is not covered by one of 
these special statutes, its situation is much less clear. When Con-
gress eliminated automatic federal question jurisdiction for federally 
chartered corporations in the 1925 Act,120 it did not specify whether 
diversity jurisdiction should be available to such corporations. More-
over, § 1332(c)(1), which defines corporate citizenship, applies only to 
state-chartered corporations, not to federal corporations.121
                                                                                                                    
be considered an agency of the United States for some or all purposes. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1441a(b)(1)(B) (2006) (Resolution Trust Corporation); id. § 1452(f) (Freddie Mac); id.
§ 1819(b)(1) (FDIC); id. § 2279aa-14(1) (Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation). 
 117. For general discussion of federally chartered corporations and diversity jurisdic-
tion, see 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts §§ 743, at 916-17 (2007); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts 
§ 151 (2003); 15 MOORE, supra note 55, § 102.56[4]; and 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, 
§ 3626, at 644-58. 
 118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) (“All national banking associations shall, for the pur-
poses of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they 
are respectively located.”); see also infra notes 220, 224-28 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1348). Section 1348 is the current version of the language adopted in the 
1887 Act, quoted supra at note 102. 
 119. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x) (2006); see also infra notes 223, 230-31 and accompanying 
text (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x)). 
 120. See supra note 105. 
 121. See Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 470 F. Supp. 2d 312, 322-
23 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 519-20 (C.D. Cal. 
1983) (“[T]here is no evidence that Congress ever considered the applicability of the 1958 
amendment to federal corporations.”); 15 MOORE, supra note 55, § 102.56[4], at 102-31 
(“[T]he 1958 amendment enacting subdivision (c) of Section 1332 . . . affected the jurisdic-
tional status of state-incorporated companies only, leaving the status of federal corpora-
tions to future judicial elaboration.”). 
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 This congressional silence created a state of uncertainty regarding 
the jurisdictional status of federally chartered corporations that pers-
ists to the current day. The Supreme Court has not helped the situa-
tion much, having addressed the issue on only one occasion. That 
single opinion, though, did not hold out much hope for federally char-
tered corporations seeking a federal forum on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship. 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.122 reached the 
Court in 1916, just a year after Congress enacted the 1915 Act that 
eliminated automatic federal question jurisdiction in cases involving 
federally chartered railway companies.123 The case involved a suit to 
foreclose a mortgage on railroad property.124 The plaintiff trustee was 
alleged to be a citizen of the State of New York.125 The defendant, the 
Texas & Pacific Railway Company, had been incorporated under an 
act of Congress.126 The plaintiff alleged that this federally chartered 
railroad “ha[d] its principal place of business and its principal operat-
ing and general offices in the Northern District of Texas, and ‘[was] a 
resident and inhabitant’ of that district.”127
 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Van Devanter, af-
firmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.128 The bulk of the opinion addressed the 1915 Act and essential-
ly concluded that the Act states exactly what it appears to state: that 
a suit by or against a federally chartered railway company does not 
arise under federal law simply by virtue of that corporation’s federal 
charter.129 But the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to in-
voke diversity jurisdiction.130 In a single-paragraph discussion of this 
issue, the Court stated it was “of [the] opinion that the company is 
not a citizen of any state.”131 The Court continued: “It was incorpo-
rated under acts of Congress, not under state laws; and its activities 
                                                                                                                    
 122. 241 U.S. 295 (1916). 
 123. See supra note 104 for a discussion of the 1915 Act. 
 124.  Bankers Trust, 241 U.S. at 301. 
 125. Id.
 126. Id. at 302 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, § 1, 16 Stat. 573, 573, and later 
amendatory acts). A second defendant, the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, was a 
Louisiana corporation. Id. at 301-02. 
 127. Id. at 301. 
 128. Id. at 310.  
 129. Id. at 305-09. Justice Van Devanter later testified to Congress in favor of expand-
ing the effect of the railway statute to apply to federally chartered corporations generally. 
See supra note 106. 
 The Court also concluded that the language of the federal acts that created the rail-
road—which provided that the railroad “ ‘shall be able to sue and be sued, plead and be 
impleaded, defend and be defended, in all courts of law and equity within the United 
States’ ”—did not confer federal jurisdiction over suits involving the company. See Bankers 
Trust, 241 U.S. at 303-05 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, § 1). 
 130. Id. at 309-10. 
 131. Id. at 309. 
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and operations were not to be confined to a single state, but to be 
carried on, as in fact they are, in different states.”132 Moreover, “Con-
gress [has not] said that it shall be regarded as possessing state  
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, as is done in respect of  
national banks.”133
 Somewhat surprisingly, the Court in Bankers Trust did not cite or 
attempt to distinguish its line of cases involving the citizenship of 
state-chartered corporations. In this regard, the Court stated only:  
Of course [a federally chartered railroad] is a citizen of the United 
States in the sense that a corporation organized under the laws of 
one of the states is a citizen of that state, but it is not within the 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that native 
born and naturalized citizens of the United States shall be citizens 
of the state wherein they reside.134
Bankers Trust appeared to leave federally chartered corporations 
in a perilous jurisdictional status. While the case dealt specifically 
with railroad corporations and the 1915 Act, the 1925 Act used very 
similar language,135 and thus there is no reason to believe that the 
Court would have viewed other federally chartered corporations dif-
ferently.136 The Court’s emphatic statements that the railway compa-
ny possessed national but not state citizenship appear to apply 
equally to all federally chartered corporations. Further, the Court 
made specific mention that Congress had not statutorily provided for 
state citizenship of railroad companies as it had done for national 
banks, a fact that generally holds true for other federally chartered 
corporations as well. 
 However, the Court’s observation that the activities of the railroad 
in Bankers Trust were not limited to a single state, either by its char-
ter or in practice, left some wiggle room. Federal corporations began 
to argue that they could be considered citizens of a particular state if 
their activities were limited to that state—in other words, that courts 
should recognize a localization exception to the Bankers Trust rule, 
even though the Supreme Court has never recognized the exception. 
 For approximately forty years after Bankers Trust, however, most 
cases that addressed whether a federally chartered corporation could 
qualify for diversity jurisdiction rejected those efforts. A leading case 
                                                                                                                    
 132. Id. The opinion did not detail the geographical extent of the railroad company’s 
activities, apart from a mention of “certain railroad properties and interests in Texas and 
Louisiana.” Id. at 302. 
 133. Id. at 310 (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. at 309-10. 
 135. Compare supra note 104 (text of 1915 Act), with supra note 105 (text of 1925 Act). 
 136. See also Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, S.C. v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 
213, 214 (1928) (stating in dicta that “[s]tate citizenship does not result from the mere cre-
ation of a corporation under federal law” (citing Bankers Trust, 241 U.S. at 309)). 
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from this period is First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Colum-
bia v. New York Title & Mortgage Co.137 That case involved a suit 
brought by the First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, a federally 
chartered corporation that had its principal place of business in Co-
lumbia, South Carolina, but was authorized to operate in both North 
Carolina and South Carolina.138 The court emphatically rejected ar-
guments that jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship existed in 
the case.139 “The general rule,” the court declared, “undoubtedly is 
that the citizenship of a federal corporation created to operate in one 
or more states is national only. Such a corporation has no state citi-
zenship for jurisdictional purposes unless Congress so enacts.”140
 A couple of things should be noted concerning the court’s opinion 
in First Carolinas. First, the court’s ruling did not turn on the fact 
that the Bank conducted activities in more than one state; the court 
specifically stated that the “general rule” applies whether the corpo-
ration operates “in one or more states.”141 Second, the court was quite 
clear in stating that only Congress can overrule the general rule: 
“Congress has not seen fit to vest Joint Stock Land Banks with state 
citizenship as it has done in the case of national banks and Interme-
diate Credit Banks.”142
 Consistent with the analysis in Bankers Trust and First Caroli-
nas, many federal corporations have been found by courts to be na-
tional citizens only, lacking state citizenship for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. These corporations have included Little League Base-
                                                                                                                    
 137. 59 F.2d 350 (E.D.S.C. 1932). 
 138. Id. at 350. The suit originally was filed in state court, but the defendant, a New 
York corporation, sought to remove it to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship. Id.
 139. Id. at 350-51. The court also noted that the 1925 Act had taken “away jurisdiction 
on the ground of federal incorporation alone.” Id.
 140. Id. at 350; see id. at 351 (“[T]he true situation seems now to be that a corporation 
organized under an act of Congress has no state citizenship for jurisdictional purposes un-
less Congress specifically declares such corporation to have a state citizenship.”); see also
Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex. 
1940). In Dallas Joint Stock, the court concluded that a Joint Stock Land Bank that trans-
acted business in Texas and Oklahoma was not a citizen of any state, as Congress had pro-
vided for state citizenship for Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, see infra note 221, but 
had not similarly provided for state citizenship for Joint Stock Land Banks. See Dallas 
Joint Stock, 35 F. Supp. at 927-28; see also id. at 928 (“We are driven to wonder why Con-
gress did not fix the citizenship of the Joint Stock Land Bank as it did the Intermediate 
Credit Bank, in the same chapter, if it really meant that the Joint Stock Land Bank should 
have a local citizenship status. We must conclude that no such local status was intended.”). 
 An earlier decision assumed that the Central Illinois Joint Stock Land Bank would 
have been a citizen of Illinois for jurisdictional purposes. See St. Louis Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Fithian, 43 F.2d 866, 866-67 (E.D. Ill. 1930). However, that assumption was dicta 
in the case, and the court did not provide a basis for the assumption. 
 141. First Carolinas, 59 F.2d at 350 (emphasis added). The court believed the “plain 
terms” of the 1925 Act supported this “general rule.” See id. at 351 (discussing effect of 
1925 Act). 
 142. Id.
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ball, Inc.,143 the American Legion,144 the Civil Air Patrol,145 the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority,146 the Disabled American Veterans,147 the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars,148 and the U.S. Olympic Committee,149
among others.150
2.   The Localization Exception Takes Root 
 Despite the restrictive construction of federal jurisdiction found in 
the early case law, eventually a number of courts began to hold that 
a federally chartered corporation could be considered a citizen of a 
particular state if the activities of the corporation were “localized” in 
that state. A 1956 case from the District of Oregon, Elwert v. Pacific 
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n,151 was the first case to adopt 
what came to be known as the localization exception. 
 The plaintiff in Elwert, a citizen of Oregon, sued a federal savings 
and loan association, Pacific First Federal.152 The defendant’s principal 
office was in Tacoma, Washington, but it also operated branches in 
two other cities in Washington and in two cities in Oregon.153
                                                                                                                    
 143. Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Welsh Publ’g Group, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 648, 655 
(M.D. Pa. 1995). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 188-97 and accompany-
ing text. 
 144. Harris v. Am. Legion, 162 F. Supp. 700, 710 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (holding that the 
American Legion has national citizenship only), aff’d, 261 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1958) (adopt-
ing district court’s opinion); see also Meteraud v. Am. Legion, No. C/A 2:07-447-DCN, 2007 
WL 1794937, at *2 (D.S.C. June 18, 2007) (citing Harris, 162 F. Supp. at 705-06)  
(same holding). 
 145. Petrousky v. Civil Air Patrol, Inc., No. 97-CV-1708, 1998 WL 213726, at *2 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1998) (holding that the Civil Air Patrol is a national citizen only). 
 146. Monsanto Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 448 F. Supp. 648, 651 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (hold-
ing that TVA, which conducts activities in four states, is not a citizen of any state). 
 147. Rice v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 295 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.D.C. 1968) (holding that 
the DAV is a national citizen only). 
 148. See Crum v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 502 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (D. Del. 1980) 
(holding that the VFW is not a state citizen for diversity purposes); see also Wandless v. 
Hughes, No. 5:07CV00111, 2008 WL 857065, at *4 n.4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing 
Crum) (holding that the VFW is national citizen only). 
 149. Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (holding 
that the USOC has national citizenship only). 
 150. See, e.g., Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1329 
(9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the FSLIC is a national citizen only); Redington v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation is a national citizen only), rev’d on other grounds, 592 F.2d 617 (2d 
Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); FDIC v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 345 F. 
Supp. 885, 887 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (holding that the FDIC is a national citizen only). 
 151. 138 F. Supp. 395 (D. Or. 1956). 
 152. Id. at 396-97. By virtue of the national bank statute to be discussed infra at note 
220 and accompanying text, codefendant Bank of California was deemed to be a citizen of 
California, the state in which its home office was located. See id.
 153. Id. at 397, 399. The Association’s charter provided that its “home office” was to be 
in Tacoma, Washington, but the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had also authorized the 
Association to operate branch offices in Seattle and Bellingham, Washington, and in Port-
land and Eugene, Oregon. Id. at 399. 
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 The court noted that, due to the 1925 Act, jurisdiction could not be 
sustained simply on the basis of the Association’s federal incorpora-
tion.154 The court nevertheless claimed that the Association could be 
regarded as a citizen of Washington because the “Association is, un-
der the basic law as well as its charter, localized within the single 
state of the State of Washington.”155 The court attempted to distin-
guish prior decisions such as Bankers Trust and First Carolinas on 
the basis that each of those cases involved “a federal corporation au-
thorized to transact its business in several states as distinguished 
from a federal corporation localized to a single state.”156
 The court in Elwert addressed whether the existence of a special 
statute for national banks should lead to the conclusion that other 
federally chartered corporations should not be regarded as having 
state citizenship. The court acknowledged that it could be inferred 
from the fact that the statute addresses only national banks “ ‘that 
Congress intended by exclusion to deny to Federal corporations other 
than national banking associations the attribute of state citizenship 
for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.’ ”157 But the 
court also thought that the national bank statute could be read as 
one expressing a general federal “policy that a corporation localized 
in any particular state shall be regarded as a citizen of that state.”158
The court believed that the rule stated in the national bank statute 
was “merely a codification of the Federal common law,” which, the 
court claimed, recognized a localization rule for national banks.159
 The court’s rationale in Elwert proves less than compelling in sev-
eral respects.160 Whether or not the court was correct that there was, 
at one time, a federal common law localization rule,161 it is extremely 
                                                                                                                    
 The Association’s charter was issued in 1937. Federal chartering of savings and loan 
associations was first authorized by the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933. See id.
 154. Id. at 400. 
 155. Id.
 156. Id. at 401; see also id. at 400 (asserting these cases stand for proposition “that a 
federal corporation which is organized to do business in several states is not a citizen of the 
state in which its principal office is located or of any other state within which it engages in 
its business”). 
 157. Id. at 401 (quoting Annotation, Status, Citizenship, Domicil, Residence, or Loca-
tion of National Corporations, 88 A.L.R. 873, 874 (1934)). The Annotation quoted in Elwert
further noted that “[s]uch an inference may possibly be, and is, justified with respect to 
Federal banks other than national banking associations, on the theory of a logical implied 
exclusion of some members of a class, arising from the express inclusion in the statute of 
other members of the same general class.” Id. 
 158. Id. at 401-02 (quoting Annotation, supra note 157, at 874). 
 159. Id. at 402. 
 160. These points are also discussed in infra Part VI.B. 
 161. The court cited only two cases in support of this supposedly “established” federal 
common law, both of which were trial court opinions involving national banks. See Elwert,
138 F. Supp. at 401 (citing Orange Nat’l Bank v. Traver, 7 F. 146 (C.C.D. Or. 1881), and 
Mfrs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Baack, 16 F. Cas. 671 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 9,052)). Baack, which 
provided support for Orange National Bank, rested upon an extensive examination of the 
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doubtful that such a rule survived the Bankers Trust decision and 
the adoption of the 1925 Act. The ruling in Bankers Trust was clear 
and unequivocal and seemed to brook no exception to the rule that a 
federally chartered corporation lacks state citizenship, absent ex-
press congressional direction to the contrary. Moreover, Congress 
clearly knew how to specify that a federally chartered corporation 
should be entitled to qualify for diversity jurisdiction, as it had done 
in the National Bank Act and in other statutes; therefore, the fact 
that Congress did not do so as part of the 1925 Act arguably indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to allow for diversity jurisdiction 
except as it otherwise had provided for in specific statutes. Similarly, 
Elwert also was a factually poor case in which to establish a localiza-
tion rule, as the activities of the savings and loan association in that 
case seem to have been no more “localized” than those of the joint 
stock land bank in First Carolinas.162
 However shaky the foundations for the localization rule may have 
been, it soon was adopted by other federal courts. The first court of 
appeals to endorse the localization rule was the Third Circuit in 
Feuchtwanger Corp. v. Lake Hiawatha Federal Credit Union.163 In 
that case, a New York corporation sued a federally incorporated cre-
dit union, claiming that the credit union should be regarded as a citi-
zen of New Jersey for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.164 The credit 
union’s charter provided it was to “maintain its office” and “operate” 
at Lake Hiawatha, New Jersey, and the charter further limited 
                                                                                                                    
statutes then governing national banks and a conclusion that those statutes “located” na-
tional banks at one location in one state. Baack, 16 F. Cas. at 673 (“It is quite apparent, 
from all these statutory provisions, that congress regards a national banking association as 
being ‘located’ at the place specified in its organization certificate. . . . It is, indeed, located 
at but one place in the state . . . .”). Thus, to the extent that these cases “established” any 
rule, it arguably would not have extended to federal corporations that were not limited by 
law to a single location in a single state.  
 162. Recall that the joint stock land bank in First Carolinas had its principal place of 
business in Columbia, South Carolina, but operated in both North and South Carolina. 
First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia v. N.Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 59 F.2d 
350, 350 (E.D.S.C. 1932). Similarly, the savings and loan (S&L) in Elwert had its principal 
office in Tacoma, Washington, but also operated branches in two Oregon cities. Elwert, 138 
F. Supp. at 399. Nothing in the facts discussed in the Elwert opinion indicates how the 
S&L’s business was distributed or what percentage of that business was concentrated in 
Washington state. Moreover, although the S&L’s charter mentioned only the Tacoma home 
office, the operation of the other branch offices in both Washington and Oregon had been 
authorized by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id. Therefore, any claim that the S&L 
was “localized” in Washington on the basis of its charter would seem rather spurious. 
 Interestingly, another judge of the same court later concluded that Pacific First Fed-
eral lacked state citizenship because it operated in more than one state. Gitschlag v. Pac. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, No. 81-516 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 1982), reprinted in Lawrence N. 
Scult, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Federal Savings and Loan Associations: Towards a 
New Theory of State Citizenship, 3 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 243, 261-62 (1984). 
 163. 272 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1959). 
 164. Id. at 454.  
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membership in the credit union to persons living or working in  
Lake Hiawatha.165
 The court noted that “the statute and the charter combined to 
make this a peculiarly local institution of a single community in the 
state of New Jersey,”166 but the court acknowledged that the federal 
statute said nothing about citizenship of federal credit unions for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.167 The court further acknowledged 
that “[t]he judge-made rule which for diversity purposes attributes to 
a corporation citizenship in the state of its incorporation simply does 
not apply to a corporation not chartered by any state.”168 The court 
nevertheless believed that the extension of such a rule to an organi-
zation such as the defendant credit union, whose membership and 
activities were limited to a single location, was “logical.”169 The court 
also asserted that if diversity jurisdiction exists for the purpose of 
guarding against local bias, such bias “is more likely to be present in 
the case of a corporation thus localized in fact than one which is con-
nected with the state only in the formal sense of having been incor-
porated there.”170
 The Lake Hiawatha court also claimed, as had the court in Elwert,
that “early cases” had recognized a localization rule for federally 
chartered banks and that Bankers Trust “recognized and respected” 
these early cases.171 The court acknowledged that First Carolinas and 
other cases involving joint stock land banks “seem to look the other 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Id. The full language in the charter regarding membership provided the following: 
“ ‘[T]he field of membership will be limited to those having the following common bond of 
association, occupation or residence: permanent residents of and those working in Lake 
Hiawatha, New Jersey; employees of this credit union; members of their immediate fami-
lies; and organizations of such persons.’ ” Id. (quoting § 5 of charter). At the time of the 
Lake Hiawatha decision, the federal statute that authorized the creation of credit unions 
provided that membership was to be “limited to groups having a common bond of occupa-
tion, or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural 
district.” Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1759). 
 166. Id. at 454-55. 
 167. Id.
 168. Id. at 455. 
 169. Id.
 170. Id.
 171. Id. The court again cited the same two nineteenth century lower court cases that 
Elwert had relied upon. See id.; see also supra note 161 (discussing the two cited cases). 
The court also claimed that the Supreme Court in Bankers Trust “held that an interstate 
railroad chartered by the United States was not a citizen of any state for diversity purpos-
es, but at the same time was careful to distinguish this situation from that of a federal cor-
poration, the activities and operations of which were confined to a single state.” Lake Hia-
watha, 272 F.2d at 455. But the court cited no language from Bankers Trust in which the 
Supreme Court supposedly made such a “careful” distinction or “recognized and respected” 
the earlier case law. See id. Bankers Trust, in fact, did not even cite the earlier cases. See 
supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
2009]              FEDERALLY CHARTERED CORPORATIONS 345 
way,”172 but the court believed the result reached by Elwert was  
more “sound.”173
 Despite the claim by the Lake Hiawatha court that it was “logical” 
to extend a localization rule to federally chartered corporations like 
the credit union in that case, the court provided no persuasive  
support for the authority of federal courts to craft such a rule in  
the absence of statutory authority. But Lake Hiawatha at least pro-
vided a better factual platform on which to found such a rule than 
Elwert had provided because the activities of that credit union were 
more truly confined to a single state both by its charter and in  
actual operation. 
3.   Expansion of the Localization Exception 
 A number of other federal decisions soon followed the lead of El-
wert and Lake Hiawatha in recognizing a localization rule for feder-
ally chartered corporations. Some of the cases expressly adopted such 
a rule,174 while others implicitly assumed, with little or no discussion, 
                                                                                                                    
 172. Lake Hiawatha, 272 F.2d at 455 (citing Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Am. Em-
ployers’ Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex. 1940), and First Carolinas Joint Stock Land 
Bank of Columbia, S.C. v. Page, 2 F. Supp. 529 (M.D.N.C. 1932)). 
 173. Id. at 456. The court also noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 recently had been amended 
to add subsection (c), providing that a corporation was to be not only a citizen of its state of 
corporation but also the state in which it maintained its principal place of business. See id.
The court thus stated that “for the future, localization less extreme than we have in this 
case will suffice to establish corporate citizenship in the administration of diversity juris-
diction.” Id. But regardless of the general accuracy of this statement, the court did not at-
tempt to explain how this had any bearing on the citizenship of federally chartered corpo-
rations, which are not governed by that statute. 
 174. In Provident National Bank v. California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 624 F. 
Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the court held the defendant federal savings and loan associa-
tion to be a citizen of California on the basis that “defendant had 138, or 71%, of its branch 
offices in California and had a substantial amount of its deposits and outstanding loans in 
California.” Id. at 861. The court reached this conclusion even though the defendant also 
operated thirty-seven branches in Florida, thirteen branches in Georgia, and six branches 
in Nevada, as well as a substantial number of depositors from other states, including 
Pennsylvania, the state of the plaintiff’s citizenship. Id. at 859. The court, though, did not 
identify any general factors to be considered or how any of those factors should be weighed. 
See id. at 861; see also Westcap Gov’t Sec., Inc. v. Homestead Air Force Base Fed. Credit 
Union, 697 F.2d 911, 911 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding activities of federal credit union 
were sufficiently localized when it was alleged to be “located in Dade County, Florida” (cit-
ing Lake Hiawatha, 272 F.2d at 455-56)); Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n of Phila., 657 F.2d 29, 31 (3d Cir. 1981) (concluding, without discussion of scope of 
corporation’s activities, that “First Federal, a Pennsylvania based federal savings and loan 
association, is deemed a citizen of Pennsylvania,” and citing Lake Hiawatha, 272 F.2d at 
455-56, for the proposition that a “federally chartered corporation has citizenship of [the] 
state where [it is] based”); Conjugal Soc’y v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 41, 46-47 
(D.P.R. 1979) (concluding, based on Elwert v. Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 138 F. 
Supp. 395 (D. Or. 1956), that federal savings and loan association was a citizen of Puerto 
Rico, where its home office was located, and including no discussion of whether association 
conducted activities or had offices outside of Puerto Rico), vacated on other grounds, 646 
F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1981); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 
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that the federal corporation was a citizen of the state in which the 
corporation maintained its principal place of business.175
 A number of commentators and cases have taken the view that 
the localization exception should apply only when a corporation’s ac-
tivities are confined to a single state.176 But although many of the 
cases have featured corporations whose activities were either limited 
to or predominantly concentrated within one state, a number of 
courts have expressly held that a federal corporation may be consi-
dered to be “localized” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction even 
though its activities are spread over several states.177
                                                                                                                    
1127, 1138 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that a Native American corporation whose only major 
activities were conducted in Alaska is an Alaskan citizen). 
 175. See, e.g., Equilease Corp. v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 647 F.2d 1069, 1070 
(10th Cir. 1981) (stating, without discussion, that “jurisdiction vests by virtue of diversity 
of citizenship”); First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Mobile, Ala. v. First S. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n of Jackson County, Miss., 614 F.2d 71, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding, without discus-
sion, that district court “correctly found” diversity jurisdiction to exist; offices of federal 
savings and loan association appear to have been located only in Alabama); Cmty. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Overland v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Am., 274 F.2d 620, 621 (8th Cir. 1960) 
(stating conclusively that “[j]urisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship and the requi-
site amount is established” and stating that the plaintiff is “engaged in the business of a 
savings and loan association in St. Louis County, Missouri”); Lincoln Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Unicorp Energy Corp., No. 91 CIV. 7370 (WK), 1992 WL 26771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 
1992) (determining implicitly, without discussion, that savings bank was New York citi-
zen); Lee Constr. Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 558 F. Supp. 165, 169-70 (D. Md. 
1982) (determining that federally chartered savings bank was citizen of Maryland, the 
state in which its principal place of business was located); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Harrison, Ark. v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (accepting, without 
discussion, that federal savings and loan association was citizen of Arkansas for purposes 
of diversity with no discussion of scope of corporation’s activities); Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Wilmette, 487 F. Supp. 909, 909-10 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (stating 
that jurisdiction is proper based on diversity of citizenship, based upon finding of fact re-
garding principal place of business, but no other findings regarding its locations or activities). 
 176. See 15 MOORE, supra note 55, § 102.56[4], at 102-131 (“To be localized, the corpo-
ration’s activities must be confined to one particular state.”); see also Petrousky v. Civil Air 
Patrol, Inc., No. 97-CV-1708, 1998 WL 213726, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1998) (noting that 
a “federally chartered corporation is considered ‘local’ [if] its business is limited to a single 
state, either by charter, by statute, or in fact”); Engelmeyer v. Prod. Credit Ass’n of the 
Midlands, 652 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (D.S.D. 1987) (“To be ‘localized,’ the corporation’s activi-
ties must be confined to one particular state.”); Parker Drilling, 451 F. Supp. at 1138 (“The 
distinguishing factor in several cases has been whether the federally chartered corporation 
generally had a situs within one state or was authorized to do business and doing business 
in several states.”). 
 177. For instance, in Waldron Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Coast Federal Bank, No. CV-
91-1750 (RJD), 1992 WL 81724 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1992), the court stated that “the availa-
bility of the localization exception should not be determined by any simplistic numerical 
formula, but instead should involve a more thorough and realistic inquiry into the nature 
of the corporation’s business.” Id. at *1. The court suggested that  
[c]ourts should look to a variety of factors, including the corporation’s principal 
place of business, the existence, if any, of branch offices outside the state, the 
volume of business transacted in different states, and any other evidence that 
tends to show the local or national nature of the corporation’s plans and operations. 
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 A leading opinion for this view is the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Loyola Federal Savings Bank v. Fickling.178 The federal savings bank 
in Loyola had its principal place of business in Maryland, and “[a]ll 
but one of its thirty-one branch offices” were in that state.179 A sub-
stantial majority of bank’s residential mortgage loans were for prop-
erty located in Maryland.180 But the savings bank also loaned money 
secured by property in other states, including the loan relating to 
South Carolina property involved in this case.181 Based on these facts, 
the district court found that the interstate activities of the savings 
bank were not sufficiently “localized” in a particular state.182
 The court of appeals, though, thought this reflected “too restric-
tive an application of the localization test”183 and that the issue of 
whether a federal corporation is sufficiently localized “should not be 
simply a question as to whether that corporation’s activities are ex-
clusive to one state.”184 The court explained: 
Such an evaluation should involve a more expansive investigation 
into the corporation’s business. A variety of factors are relevant to 
this inquiry, such as the corporation’s principal place of business, 
the existence of branch offices outside the state, the amount of 
business transacted in different states, and any other data provid-
ing evidence that the corporation is local or national in nature.185
                                                                                                                    
Id. The court found the federal savings bank to be a citizen of California because it main-
tained its principal office in Los Angeles County, because it did not operate any offices out-
side of California, because it “consistently targeted its business activity to California,” and 
because “[o]ut of state loans account for less than five per cent of [the bank’s] business.” Id.
at *2; see also id. (“Moreover, regardless of the scope of the defendant’s authority to do 
business statewide, or nationwide, . . . the fact remains that the actual business of Coast is 
overwhelmingly local in nature.” (citation omitted)). 
 178. 58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995).  
 179. Id. at 606. 
 180. Id. For loans relating to property outside of Maryland, “payments were made in 
Maryland.” Id. 
 181. See id. at 605. 
 182. See id. at 606 (summarizing the district court’s ruling). The district court appar-
ently relied upon the Third Circuit’s holding in Lake Hiawatha. Id. (stating that “the dis-
trict court felt constrained in extending its analysis past those facts found in [Lake Hiawa-
tha],” where “the credit union in question restricted its operations to one particular com-
munity within the state of New Jersey”). The Eleventh Circuit had relied upon Lake Hia-
watha in a previous case, Westcap Government Securities, Inc., which is summarized supra
at note 174. 
 183. Loyola Federal, 58 F.3d at 606. The court also stated that Lake Hiawatha had 
“demonstrated a similar thought when it said, ‘[t]hus, for the future, localization less ex-
treme than we have in this case will suffice to establish corporate citizenship in the ad-
ministration of diversity jurisdiction.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Feuchtwanger 
Corp. v. Lake Hiawatha Fed. Credit Union, 272 F.2d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 1959)); see also su-
pra note 173. 
 184. Loyola Federal, 58 F.3d at 606. 
 185. Id.
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Applying these factors to Loyola Federal, the court of appeals found 
it to be a Maryland citizen “through its localized activities.”186
4.   Recent Restrictions of the Localization Exception 
 Although the localization exception is now firmly entrenched, a 
number of courts have been critical of expanding the exception to 
federal corporations that operate in more than a single state.187 One 
of the strongest statements along these lines can be found in Little 
League Baseball, Inc. v. Welsh Publishing Group, Inc.188 The court 
there indicated that a federally chartered corporation may be deemed 
a citizen of a particular state when its activities “are limited to a sin-
gle state, either factually or by charter,”189 but “if the corporation is 
organized to do business in several states, and in fact does so, it has 
national citizenship only.”190
 The court emphasized that determining whether a federally char-
tered corporation is sufficiently localized is significantly different 
from determining the principal place of business of a state-chartered 
corporation.191 Stating that “[t]he main difference between the two 
analyses is the end result sought,”192 the court further explained: 
                                                                                                                    
 186. Id. Other courts, relying upon Loyola Federal, have found particular federal cor-
porations to be sufficiently localized even though they conducted activities in several 
states. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 00-596, 2000 WL 
1100800 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2000). In Sovereign Bank, the savings bank was headquartered 
in Pennsylvania but had 137 branches in New Jersey and six in Delaware, plus nonbranch 
offices in five other states. Id. at *1. The court found that the localization exception applied 
because more than half of bank’s employees, branches, and ATMs were in Pennsylvania, 
because more than seventy percent of its loans originated in Pennsylvania, and because its 
holding company and several wholly-owned subsidiaries were Pennsylvania corporations. Id.
 187. See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, Inc., No. 92 Civ 0790 (MBM), 
1992 WL 358759, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1992) (refusing to extend localization excep-
tion to California-based savings institution that made over 1000 loans in New York total-
ing over $1 billion and holding that the localization “exception entails a ‘higher level of in-
volvement with a state than is required to establish a principal place of business under § 
1332(c)(1)’ ” (quoting 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.77 (2.-4) 
(2d ed. 1991))); see also cases cited supra note 176. 
 188. 874 F. Supp. 648 (M.D. Pa. 1995). In that case, Little League Baseball, a federally 
chartered corporation, commenced a breach of contract action in state court. Id. at 649. The 
defendant removed the case to federal district court, alleging that it was a citizen of New 
York and that Little League Baseball was a citizen of Pennsylvania. Id. at 649-50. 
 189. Id. at 651. The court noted that Little League Baseball was “authorized by statute 
to conduct its activities throughout the United States and abroad.” Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. § 
1075(a)). The court therefore devoted the remainder of its discussion to “whether in fact
the activities of the corporation are confined within the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania such that the activities may be said to be localized.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 190. Id. (“A federally chartered corporation with widespread activities, authorized and 
actual, may not be the subject of diversity jurisdiction absent specific statutory language 
providing for citizenship in a particular state or incorporating the entity as a ‘body corpo-
rate’ of a particular state.”). 
 191. Id. at 652 (“Defendant’s contention, however, confuses the concepts of proving the 
citizenship of a corporation incorporated under state law with evidence of its principal 
place of business and proving the citizenship of a federally chartered corporation with evi-
2009]              FEDERALLY CHARTERED CORPORATIONS 349 
The test for state corporations is a comparison of states to see in 
which state the operations of the corporation are most concen-
trated; that state is the principal place of business of the corpora-
tion. The test for federal corporations is not a comparison but an 
examination of whether or not the corporation conducts its  
activities over a widespread area. If so, then its activities are  
not localized.193
The court was willing to assume that Little League Baseball had its 
principal place of business in South Williamsport, Pennsylvania.194
After reviewing the corporation’s extensive activities in other states 
and around the world,195 the court found that those activities were 
                                                                                                                    
dence that its activities are localized.”); Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 
522 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (“[L]ocalization requires confinement of activities, either by char-
ter or in fact, to a single state, whereas a principal place of business can be maintained de-
spite the transaction of interstate business. . . . [T]he tests for localization and principal 
place of business have not been assimilated. While, in order to be localized in a particular 
state, a federal corporation must have its principal place of business in that state, main-
tenance of a principal place of business does not in and of itself amount to localization.”). 
 For a good example of the mischief that can ensue when a court loses sight of this 
distinction, see Ponce de Leon Federal Savings Bank v. Ensign Bank, F.S.B., No. 86 CIV. 
7583 (SWK), 1987 WL 14912 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1987). There, the court was considering a 
suit between two federal savings banks. Id. at *2. The court first found, without any dis-
cussion, that the plaintiff bank was a citizen of New York because its “principal offices” 
were located there; the court gave no discussion to what activities the plaintiff may have 
conducted elsewhere. The court then devoted fuller discussion to the citizenship of the de-
fendant bank, Ensign, but applied the wrong standard to it. The court incorrectly stated 
that a federally chartered corporation such as Ensign is a citizen of “the state in which the 
activities of the bank are localized, or in the state which is the bank’s ‘principal place of 
business.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court then compared Ensign’s 
level of activities in Florida with those in New York, as it would do in determining the 
principal place of business of a state-chartered corporation. See id. at *1-2. The court found 
that “despite its current designation of Florida as its ‘home office’, [sic] New York is the lo-
cation in which Ensign’s activities are localized, and is its ‘principal place of business’; New 
York is both its ‘nerve center’ and the situs of its ‘corporate operations.’ ” Id. at *2. As a re-
sult, the court dismissed the case for lack of diversity of citizenship. Id. The court did not 
discuss whether Ensign conducted activities in other states or the level of those activities. 
See id. at *1-2. Thus, although the end result in Ponce de Leon may have been supporta-
ble—it may be that one or both of the corporations’ activities were insufficiently “localized” 
for the exception to apply—the court’s misplaced focus calls that result into question. 
 192. Little League Baseball, 874 F. Supp. at 653. 
 193. Id. The court also emphasized that “activities” of a corporation are different from, 
and broader than, the “operations” of a corporation that are examined for purposes of de-
termining the corporation’s principal place of business:  
“[A]ctivities” are exercises of corporate powers for the purposes set forth in the 
statutes creating the [federally chartered] corporation, such powers being au-
thorized by the statutes or charter as well as the corporate constitution and by-
laws; “activities” is not synonymous with, and actually is broader than, the fac-
tors considered in the operational test for locating the principal place of busi-
ness. 
Id. at 653-54; see also id. at 653 (indicating that “operations” includes such exercises as 
“conducting business, owning property, [and] hiring employees”). 
 194. See id.; see also id. at 651-52 (detailing the corporation’s activities in Pennsylvania). 
 195. See id. at 654-55. 
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“conducted regularly over a wide area, well beyond the territorial 
limits of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,”196 with the result that 
Little League Baseball had no state citizenship for purposes of feder-
al diversity jurisdiction.197
 A subsequent decision from the Eastern District of Virginia, Icel-
and Seafood Corp. v. National Consumer Cooperative Bank,198 relied 
heavily upon Little League Baseball in the course of determining that 
the National Consumer Cooperative Bank was a national citizen on-
ly, not a citizen of the District of Columbia.199 The Bank argued that 
it should be considered to be “localized” in the District on the basis 
that “its principal place of business is in the District, that all of its 
corporate, financial and loan records are kept there, as are all of its 
executive officers, department heads and 97 percent of its employees, 
and that its loan agreements specify that District of Columbia  
law governs.”200
 The court, though, pointed out that the Bank’s chartering statute 
stated that the Bank was created to provide assistance “on a nation-
wide basis”201 and the Bank was authorized to “ ‘make loans and offer 
its services throughout the United States, its territories and posses-
sions, and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.’ ”202 The court also 
examined the scope of the bank’s actual activities, stressing that 
“[a]ctivities . . . are not the same as operations in making the citizen-
ship determination.”203 The court noted that the Bank made loans in 
                                                                                                                    
 196. Id. at 655. The court noted each of the corporation’s activities was “consistent with 
the purposes for which [it] is chartered, and [was] a valid exercise of its corporate powers.” 
Id.; see also id. at 654 (discussing statutory sources of the corporation’s powers to conduct 
these activities). 
 197. Id. at 655. The court therefore remanded the lawsuit to state court. See id. at 656. 
 198. 285 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 199. See id. at 724-26. Congress created the National Consumer Cooperative Bank in 
1978 “for the purpose of making available ‘necessary financial and technical assistance to 
cooperative self-help endeavors as a means of strengthening the Nation’s economy.’ ” Id. at 
722-23 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000)). Although the United States once owned all of the 
Bank’s Class A stock, the Bank was privatized in 1981, and it therefore does not qualify for 
automatic federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006). See id. at 723; see
also id. at 726-27 (discussing the Bank’s attempt to support jurisdiction pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. § 3012(6) (2000) and rejecting that argument as untimely). 
 200. Iceland Seafood, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 725. The Bank also pointed out that although 
it operated branch offices in three states, only one of those offices had more than one em-
ployee. Id. The Bank also argued that its activities in other states, which mostly consisted 
of providing loans and receiving security interests in property, did not amount to “transact-
ing business” as defined in the Model Business Corporation Act. See id. (citing MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 15.01(b)(7)-(8) (2002)). The court, though, made short shrift of this attempted 
reliance upon the Model Act: “That these loans may not constitute business transactions 
for the purposes of the Model Act does not preclude their consideration as activities in the 
broader reaching localization analysis.” Id.
 201. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 3001). 
 202. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 3011 (2000)). 
 203. Id.
2009]              FEDERALLY CHARTERED CORPORATIONS 351 
several states204 and had a nationwide system of branch offices.205
Thus, because the Bank was authorized to and actually did conduct 
activities nationwide, it lacked state citizenship.206 In the absence of 
a specific designation of state citizenship in the federal chartering 
statute, a finding of state citizenship will be appropriate only when a 
corporation’s activities are of an “obviously localized nature.”207
 As seen in Little League Baseball and Iceland Seafood, the trend 
in the recent case law seems to be toward more restrictive applica-
tion of the localization rule, particularly as federal corporations have 
increasingly engaged in activities that extend over more than a sin-
gle state. In Auriemma Consulting Group, Inc. v. Universal Savings 
Bank, F.A.,208 for example, the court found the federal savings bank 
to be a national citizen only, not a citizen of Wisconsin, the state in 
which its headquarters was located.209 The court there emphasized 
the “general rule” that a federally chartered corporation has no state 
citizenship, subject to the “limited exception” that applies “if the cor-
poration’s activities are ‘localized’ within a single state.”210 A federal 
corporation will have national citizenship only when its activities ex-
tend to several states.211
                                                                                                                    
 204. Id. (noting the Bank’s annual report indicated that it “made loans to cooperatives 
in New Jersey, New York, California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania in 2002 alone”). 
 205. Id. at 726 (“Its loan making activities are clearly national in scope, and its secured 
collateral is similarly disbursed. Furthermore, in its Annual Report, NCB holds itself  
out to cooperatives as a financing entity with nationwide resources and coverage.”  
(citation omitted)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. The court also determined the Bank’s chartering statute did not confer state 
citizenship on the Bank. See id. at 723 (quoting and discussing 12 U.S.C. § 3011 (2000), 
which provides that “[t]he principal office of the Bank shall be in Washington, District of 
Columbia, and, for the purpose of venue, shall be considered a resident thereof”). The court 
“reject[ed] the suggestion that venue is equivalent to citizenship for the purposes of juris-
diction” and noted that “[p]rincipal office, as used in the chartering statutes, is not the 
same as principal place of business as used in determining jurisdiction.” Id.
 208. 367 F. Supp. 2d 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The suit involved a breach of contract action 
filed against Universal Savings Bank in state court, which the savings bank sought to re-
move on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See id. at 312. 
 209. Id. at 314-15.  
 210. Id. at 313. 
 211. Id. The savings bank argued its Wisconsin office was home to its parent company 
as well as fifty employees, the bank’s administrative and central accounting functions were 
located there, all loans were funded by that office and all deposits ultimately ended up 
there, all board meetings were held there, and four of its five directors resided in Wiscon-
sin. See id. at 314 (noting further that the bank had two retail branch offices, including one 
in Michigan, but that the bank attempted to “downplay[] the significance of this office, de-
scribing its operations as ‘inactive’ and state[d] that this branch ‘serves merely as the op-
erations and customer support center for [the bank’s] credit card business’ ”). But the 
court, in response, noted that the bank’s charter set forth a broad purpose that “in no way 
limits the bank’s activities to a single state.” Id. The bank’s website indicated that it oper-
ated offices in other states. See id. (noting that the website indicated that the bank operat-
ed administrative offices in Arizona and California in addition to the Wisconsin and Michi-
gan offices). The bank had solicited business throughout the country by means of its web-
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 The trend toward restrictive interpretation of the localization rule 
continues in the recent case of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB v. Frank 
T. Yoder Mortgage,212 where the court emphasized the different juris-
dictional treatment between national banks and other federally char-
tered corporations: “Put simply, federally chartered corporations are 
national citizens ineligible to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction, 
while national banks are deemed citizens of the state in which they 
are incorporated as well as the state where their principal place of 
business is located.”213 The court rejected Lehman Brothers’ argu-
ment that the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. v. Schmidt214—which concluded that a national bank will be 
treated as a citizen of the state in which it maintains its principal 
place of business215—created any change in the law regarding other 
types of federally chartered corporations.216 The court noted that na-
tional banks and other federally chartered corporations are “go-
verned by different statutes”217 and the Supreme Court in Wachovia 
Bank had “carefully cabined” its discussion and holding to § 1348, 
the statute governing national banks.218 Moreover, the court believed 
it to be “exceedingly unlikely that the Supreme Court would effect 
such a dramatic change” of “overruling its prior opinion in Bankers’ 
                                                                                                                    
site. Id. (noting that “[m]ortgages and credit cards [sic] applications can be processed on 
line”). Moreover, the majority of the bank’s credit card customers were from out of state. 
Id. The court thus had “little difficulty” concluding that the bank was a national citizen on-
ly. Id. The court concluded that, “[u]nlike those cases where localization has been held, 
there is no indication that USB has limited its business (or the majority of thereof [sic]) to 
the State of Wisconsin.” Id. at 314-15. 
 212. 415 F. Supp. 2d 636 (E.D. Va. 2006). Lehman Brothers Bank (LBB), a federally 
chartered savings bank, was the sole subsidiary of Aurora, LLC, a Delaware limited liabili-
ty corporation. Id. at 638. LBB and Aurora sued four defendants in federal district court, 
asserting fraud and contract claims arising under state law. Id. at 637. It was undisputed 
that LBB had its principal place of business in New York, where its executive offices were 
located, but LBB also operated branch offices in eleven states and processed loan applica-
tions from forty states in 2003 alone. Id. at 638 & n.2. 
 213. Id. at 641. The court found LBB’s activities were “national in scope,” making it 
“ineligible for the localization exception.” Id. at 640. The court also found Aurora, as a li-
mited liability corporation, had the same citizenship as LBB. Id. at 641 (citing Gen. Tech. 
Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda., 388 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2004)). The court therefore 
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 642. 
 Auriemma Consulting and Lehman Bros. were both decided prior to the effective 
date of 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x) (2006), which now provides a federal savings association will be 
considered a citizen “only of the State in which such savings association has its home of-
fice.” See infra notes 223, 230-31 and accompanying text. Had the statute been in effect at 
the time these cases were filed, the particular jurisdictional issue in these cases would 
have been decided differently. See Franklin Bank v. Tindall, No. 07-13748, 2008 WL 
408413, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2008) (discussing effect of enactment of § 1464(x)). 
 214. 546 U.S. 303 (2006); see also infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (discussing 
Wachovia Bank).
 215. Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 318. 
 216. See Lehman Bros., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 641-42. 
 217. Id. at 641 & n.12 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1348-1349 (2000)). 
 218. Id. at 642.  
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[sic] Trust, as well as ninety years of lower court jurisprudence,” 
without explicitly discussing its intent to do so.219
5.   Statutory Provisions for Diversity Jurisdiction 
 Several scattered statutes, each somewhat different, provide for 
diversity jurisdiction as to select categories of federally chartered 
corporations. Shortly after Congress eliminated automatic federal 
question jurisdiction for national banks, it clarified that national 
banks could qualify for diversity jurisdiction. Congress did so by spe-
cifying, in what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1348, that national banks would 
be “deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively lo-
cated.”220 A similar statute, enacted in 1971, provides that institu-
tions of the Federal Farm Credit System are deemed to be citizens of 
the states in which their “principal office is located.”221 A handful of 
other federal corporations are deemed to be citizens of the District of 
Columbia by virtue of particular provisions in their chartering sta-
tutes.222 Recently, in 2006, Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x), 
                                                                                                                    
 219. Id.
 220. See supra note 102 (quoting text of 1887 Act). The current version of the statute, 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006), provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action com-
menced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any 
national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such 
association, and any action by a banking association established in the district 
for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by 
such chapter. 
All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions  
by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respec-
tively located. 
The statute applies only to national banking associations. See Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Fed. Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 357 (1921) (holding that the statute does not apply to 
Federal Reserve Banks). 
 221. See Pub. L. No. 92-181, § 5.24, 85 Stat. 583, 624 (1971) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
2258 (2006)) (“Each institution of the System shall for the purposes of jurisdiction be 
deemed to be a citizen of the State, commonwealth, or District of Columbia in which its 
principal office is located.”). Institutions covered by this statute include the Farm Credit 
Banks, federal land bank associations, production credit associations, and others. See 12 
U.S.C. § 2002(a) (composition of Farm Credit System). The statute “was enacted to ‘give 
production credit associations the same access to the Federal district courts as is enjoyed 
by private citizens, corporations and other legal entities.’ ” Engelmeyer v. Prod. Credit 
Ass’n of the Midlands, 652 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (D.S.D. 1987) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-
609, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2148, 2150).  
 A predecessor statute provided that a Federal Intermediate Credit Bank “ ‘for pur-
poses of jurisdiction shall be deemed a citizen of the State where it is located.’ ” Fed. In-
termediate Credit Bank of Columbia, S.C. v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213, 214-15 (1928) (quoting 
statute then codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1023). The Federal Intermediate Credit Banks have 
since merged with the former Federal Land Banks to form what are now known as Farm 
Credit Banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2000) (establishment of Farm Credit Banks). 
 222. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 941(c) (2006) (holding that the Rural Telephone Bank is 
deemed to be citizen of District of Columbia for jurisdictional purposes); 47 U.S.C. § 614(b) 
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providing that federal savings associations are to be deemed citizens 
of “the State in which such savings association has its home office.”223
 Although these statutes provide more certainty regarding the ju-
risdictional status of federal corporations that fall within their scope, 
they have led to a number of interpretative issues and inconsisten-
cies. The first arose from use of the word “located” in § 1348. At first, 
when branch banking by national banks was largely prohibited,224
the statute presented little interpretive difficulty; a national bank 
could only be “located” in one state. After Congress authorized inter-
state branch banking in 1994, however, questions began to emerge. 
Should a national bank be considered to be “located” in every state in 
which it maintained a branch office, thereby making it harder for the 
bank to invoke diversity jurisdiction, or should it be regarded as “lo-
cated” only in the state in which it maintained its home office? The 
district and circuit courts were evenly split on this issue.225
 The Supreme Court eventually resolved this circuit split with its 
2006 decision in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt,226 in which the 
Court concluded that a national bank would be considered a citizen 
only of the state designated in the bank’s articles of incorporation as 
the location of its main office.227 The Court claimed that its interpre-
tation of § 1348 was necessary to prevent national banks from becom-
ing “singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their 
access to federal courts.”228
 For a while, the Wachovia decision created a disparity in the ju-
risdictional treatment of national banks and other federally char-
tered savings associations. While national banks received the benefit 
of § 1348 and the Court’s favorable interpretation of that statute, 
                                                                                                                    
(2000) (same for Telecommunications Development Fund); 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b) (2000) 
(holding that the National Railroad Passenger Association (Amtrak) “is a citizen only of 
the District of Columbia when deciding original jurisdiction of the district courts of the 
United States in a civil action”). 
 223. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x) (2006). 
 224. See Lund, supra note 31, at 79-80 (summarizing history of branch banking by na-
tional banks). 
 225. See id. at 85-96 (discussing split among district and circuit courts in interpreta-
tion of term “located” as used in § 1348). Even among the courts that rejected the view that 
a national bank was “located” in every state in which it operated an office, a further split 
developed as to how the word “located” should be interpreted. Id. at 88 n.81 (“Some of the 
courts construed ‘located’ as referring to the bank’s principal place of business, others in-
terpreted it as referring to the place listed in the organization certificate, others read it to 
mean the place designated in the most recent articles of incorporation, and still others 
used some combination of these.”). 
 226. 546 U.S. 303 (2006). For a discussion and critique of the Wachovia Bank case and 
of the inconsistencies it creates, see generally Lund, supra note 31. 
 227. Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 307; see also Lund, supra note 31, at 97-99 (summa-
rizing holding and rationale of Wachovia Bank).
 228. Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 319. But see Lund, supra note 31, at 103-06 (rebut-
ting Court’s claim that contrary interpretation of § 1348 would have created jurisdictional 
“anomaly”). 
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federally chartered saving associations remained subject to the vaga-
ries of the less favorable “localization exception” case law.229 Congress 
eliminated this disparity when it enacted § 1464(x), which took effect 
on October 13, 2006.230 That statute provides that a “federal savings 
association shall be considered to be a citizen only of the State in 
which such savings association has its home office.”231
 Together, § 1348 (as interpreted in Wachovia Bank) and § 1464(x) 
considerably clarify the jurisdictional status of national banks and 
federal savings associations.232 But these statutes have done nothing 
to clarify the status of other federally chartered corporations, which 
still must contend with the less certain and less favorable localiza-
tion exception case law. 
 Moreover, although the Court in Wachovia Bank apparently be-
lieved that its interpretation of § 1348 would lead to parity between 
                                                                                                                    
 229. See Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB v. Frank T. Yoder Mortgage, 415 F. Supp. 2d 636, 
641-42 (E.D. Va. 2006) (concluding that Wachovia Bank did not affect jurisdictional treat-
ment of federal savings associations, which remained subject to prior case law); see also
Lund, supra note 31, at 105-06 (discussing disparity between national banks and federal 
savings associations created by Wachovia Bank’s interpretation of § 1348). 
 Several early attempts to enact a jurisdictional statute to govern federal savings as-
sociations proved unsuccessful. See, e.g., H.R. 1375, 108th Cong. § 213 (2003) (citizenship 
in state of “home office”); S. 1812, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (citizenship in state of “main of-
fice”); H.R. 3951, 107th Cong. § 213 (2002) (same). 
 230. See Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 403, 
120 Stat. 1966, 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x) (2006)) (“In determining whether a 
Federal court has diversity jurisdiction over a case in which a Federal savings association 
is a party, the Federal savings association shall be considered to be a citizen only of the 
State in which such savings association has its home office.”). The statute was adopted ap-
proximately nine months after the Wachovia Bank decision, which was handed down in 
January 2006. It is unclear, however, whether the Court’s decision had any direct causal 
effect on Congress’s approval of the statute. The statute was only one part of a much 
broader Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act. See id. The House version of the legisla-
tion, which the Senate version ultimately replaced, had been introduced several months 
prior to the Wachovia Bank ruling. See infra note 231. The legislative history makes very 
little mention of the jurisdictional provision, stating only that “[t]his section expressly pro-
vides that a Federal savings association is only a citizen of the State in which its home of-
fice is located for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.” S. REP. NO. 109-256, at 4 
(2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1219, 1223. 
 231. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(x). The House version of the proposed legislation—which the 
House initially approved, before later substituting the Senate version—would have pro-
vided that a federal savings association would be “considered to be a citizen only of the 
States in which such savings association has its home office and its principal place of busi-
ness (if the principal place of business is in a different State than the home office).” H.R. 
3505, 109th Cong. § 213 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 232. Currently, however, there is a split in the case law as to whether § 1464(x) applies 
retroactively to cases that were pending on the date when the statute became effective. 
Compare World Sav. Bank, FSB v. Wu, No. CV 08-00887 HRL, 2008 WL 1994881, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (statute does not apply retroactively), with First Midwest Bank-
Deerfield Branches v. Metabank, No. CIV 06-4114, 2007 WL 913893, at *4 (D.S.D. Mar. 23, 
2007) (statute applies retroactively), and First Premier Bank v. Metabank, No. CIV 06-
4115, 2007 WL 963492, at *3-4 (D.S.D. Mar. 23, 2007) (same). 
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national banks and similar state-chartered corporations,233 the deci-
sion actually resulted in disparity, at least in certain circumstances. 
Recall that a state-chartered corporation is a citizen of two states: 
the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it main-
tains its principal place of business.234 A national bank, though, is 
considered to be only a citizen of the state in which it maintains its 
home office, as stated in the bank’s articles of incorporation.235 The 
Court believed that this difference would be of “scant practical signi-
ficance,” however, because “in almost every case, . . . the location  
of a national bank’s main office and of its principal place of  
business coincide.”236
 The Court’s optimism was misplaced, however. Two large national 
banks, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo, have their principal plac-
es of business in states other than those designated as the location of 
their home offices.237 In Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A.,238 the court noted that, although the Supreme Court in 
Wachovia Bank did not “conclusively reject[] the possibility that a 
national bank is also a citizen of the state in which it has its princip-
al place of business,” the “fairest reading” of the Court’s opinion was 
that the Court had “expressed skepticism over whether the term ‘lo-
cated’ in § 1348 included a national bank’s ‘principal place of busi-
ness,’ in view of the absence of such term in the statute.”239 Address-
ing the issue on its own, the court in Excelsior Funds concluded that 
                                                                                                                    
 233. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 307 (“[T]he access of a federally chartered 
bank to a federal forum would be drastically curtailed in comparison to the access afforded 
state banks and other state-incorporated entities [if the statute were to be construed oth-
erwise]. Congress, we are satisfied, created no such anomaly.”); see also id. at 319 (stating 
the Court’s interpretation of § 1348 avoided an “incongruous outcome” that would have 
“rendered national banks singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access 
to federal courts”). 
 234. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
 236. Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 317 n.9. Because Wachovia had both its home office 
and principal place of business in North Carolina, the Court did not have to determine 
whether a national bank is “located” in the state in which it maintains its principal place  
of business. 
 237. See Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 470 F. Supp. 2d 312, 
317 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that both JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo have their 
main offices and principal places of business in different states). 
 238. 470 F. Supp. 2d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The action had been filed in New York state 
court and had been removed to federal court by Chase, the defending party. Id. at 312-13. 
Chase has its main office in Ohio, but the parties stipulated that its principal place of 
business was in New York. Id. at 313. The issue of Chase’s citizenship had twofold signific-
ance: first, as to whether diversity of citizenship existed, and, if so, as to whether Chase 
properly could remove the action to federal court. The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
(2006), provides that removal based upon diversity of citizenship is proper only when none 
of the defendants “is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 
 239. Excelsior Funds, 470 F. Supp. 2d. at 317 (discussing Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 
317 n.9). 
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a national bank would not be considered a citizen of the state in 
which it maintained its principal place of business.240
 A similar result would seem to follow from § 1464(x), which uses 
the less ambiguous term “home office.” “Home office” has a clear 
meaning within the statutes governing federal savings associa-
tions,241 and it is hard to see how it could be construed to include the 
state of an association’s principal place of business. 
V.   SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE AND 
AN ILLUSTRATION
 As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, currently there is a 
great deal of disparity in the jurisdictional treatment of state-
chartered and federally chartered corporations. State corporations 
benefit from the relative clarity of § 1332(c)(1). Under that statute, a 
state-chartered corporation, no matter how large or small, will be 
considered a citizen of two states at most: the state in which it was 
incorporated and the state in which it maintains its principal place of 
business. The situation involving federally chartered corporations 
varies quite a bit from one type of corporation to another, however, 
and in some cases is much less clear. Some federally chartered corpo-
rations—those in which the federal government owns more than fifty 
percent of the capital stock and a handful of others that benefit from 
special statutes—may still invoke federal jurisdiction simply on the 
basis of their federal charter.  
 If the federal corporation is not among this select group but is a 
national bank or a federal savings association, Congress has provided 
by statute that the corporation will be considered a citizen of a single 
state—the state in which the corporation maintains its home office. 
                                                                                                                    
 240. See id. at 317-23; see also Cole v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 437 F. Supp. 2d 974, 
976 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (concluding that Wells Fargo Bank is a citizen only of South Da-
kota, the state in which its home office is located).  
 The court in Excelsior Funds noted that when § 1348 was enacted, a state-chartered 
corporation was considered to be only a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated; 
the “principal place of business” aspect was not introduced until several years later, in 
1958. Excelsior Funds, 470 F. Supp. 2d. at 319; see also supra Part III (discussing histori-
cal evolution of jurisdictional treatment of state-chartered corporations). Therefore, in the 
court’s view, if Congress intended to create “parity” between national banks and state-
chartered entities, the relevant point of comparison was the time when the statute was 
adopted. See Excelsior Funds, 470 F. Supp. 2d. at 319. “[N]either the statutory text nor the 
legislative history support reading the term ‘located’ in § 1348 to incorporate by reference a 
concept that did not exist until ten years later. . . .” Id. at 322. 
 One commentator has argued the Excelsior court’s interpretation of § 1348 may have 
been “too literal” and that the court “did not sufficiently weigh the fundamental purpose 
behind” the statute and its predecessors. Jay Teitelbaum, Diversity Jurisdiction: Where Do 
National Banks Live?, 124 BANKING L.J. 227, 233 (2007). 
 241. For other uses of the term “home office” within the Home Owners’ Loan Act,  
see, for example, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(c)(4)(A)-(B), (d)(1)(A), (n)(1), (r)(1), (r)(2)(C), 
1467a(o)(5)(D) (2006). 
358 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:317 
Unlike state corporations, a national bank’s or a federal savings  
association’s principal place of business has no bearing on its citizen-
ship. In this sense, these federal corporations enjoy a preferred  
jurisdictional status when compared with similar state- 
chartered corporations. 
 All other federal corporations, however, have a much less certain 
and less privileged status. No federal statute specifies whether they 
may qualify for diversity jurisdiction, and the case law is unclear and 
confusing. Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in the Bankers 
Trust case, which seemed to signal that a federal corporation would 
never be considered to possess state citizenship, the localization ex-
ception now seems to be regarded as an established rule of law. But 
there continues to be substantial uncertainty as to whether and 
when that rule will apply to a federal corporation that conducts activ-
ities in more than one state. 
 To illustrate that uncertainty, consider the case of a federal credit 
union that operates in more than one state. Assume that the credit 
union serves employees and retirees of telecommunications providers 
in North Carolina and South Carolina.242 The credit union was at one 
time chartered by North Carolina, but it converted to a federal char-
ter a number of years ago. Its “administrative branch” is in Char-
lotte, North Carolina, but it has five other branch offices in North 
Carolina and four in South Carolina. The bulk of the organization’s 
business undoubtedly is with customers who live in the two states, 
but we can assume that the organization does business with custom-
ers who live in a number of other states as well (including current 
employees of telecommunications companies who commute to work 
from other states, family members who live in other states, and reti-
rees who have moved to other states). 
 If the credit union still retained its state charter, its jurisdictional 
status would be clear. It would, without a doubt, be regarded as a cit-
izen of North Carolina, the state in which it was incorporated. It 
might also be regarded as a citizen of South Carolina, depending on 
how its business was distributed and whether the court regarded 
South Carolina as the organization’s “principal place of business,” 
but this seems unlikely on these facts. 
 If the credit union were, instead, a national bank or a federal sav-
ings association, its jurisdictional status would be even clearer. In 
                                                                                                                    
 242. The facts of this illustration are drawn from information found on the website of 
an actual federal credit union, Carolinas Telco Federal Credit Union. Carolinas Telco 
(Home/Welcome), http://www.ctelco.org (last visited June 1, 2009). I use this example be-
cause I have some personal familiarity with the organization, which has an office in the 
same building in which my law school office is located. However, the example should hold 
true for many other federal credit unions and other federal corporations. 
2009]              FEDERALLY CHARTERED CORPORATIONS 359 
that case, it would be considered a citizen of only North Carolina, the 
state in which the credit union maintains its home office. 
 As things actually stand, however, this credit union might be con-
sidered a North Carolina citizen, or it might have no state citizenship 
at all. This situation very closely parallels that of the First Carolinas 
Joint Stock Land Bank, which, although it operated only in North 
Carolina and South Carolina, was held to have no state citizenship.243
 It is true that the localization rule has taken firmer root since the 
First Carolinas case was decided. It is also true that one circuit, ap-
plying that rule in Feuchtwanger Corp. v. Lake Hiawatha Federal 
Credit Union,244 found that the activities of a federal credit union 
were sufficiently localized to allow the credit union to establish state 
citizenship. But the court there stressed that the activities of that or-
ganization were limited to a single town in a single state.245 While 
some courts have applied the localization rule to corporations that 
conduct activities in more than one state, others have limited it to 
the single state setting.246
 Federal corporations, like our hypothetical credit union, face a 
very uncertain status under the current law. These corporations 
would benefit from a statute or other legal rule that clarifies their ju-
risdictional status. 
 Federal corporations that conduct activities nationwide would also 
benefit from such a statute. As we have seen, a state corporation that 
conducts activities nationwide qualifies for diversity jurisdiction as a 
citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state in which its prin-
cipal place of business is located.247 But no case has applied the loca-
lization exception to a federal corporation that carries on nationwide 
activities. These federal corporations are at a distinct jurisdictional 
disadvantage when compared with their state counterparts. 
VI.   A PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
 The current state of the law regarding the jurisdictional treat-
ment of federal corporations can charitably be described as being in 
shambles. Some federal corporations—for the most part, government 
corporations—can still invoke federal jurisdiction based solely on 
their federal charters.248 This select group enjoys what can accurately 
                                                                                                                    
 243. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. N.Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 59 F.2d 350 
(E.D.S.C. 1932); see also supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 244. 272 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1959); see also supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text 
(discussing Feuchtwanger Corp. v. Lake Hiawatha Federal Credit Union).
 245. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra Part IV.B.3-4. 
 247. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 248. This result is achieved, however, through a mixed bag of statutes that employ 
widely varying language. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
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be thought of as “super” jurisdictional status. Some other federal cor-
porations are defined by various statutes as citizens of a single 
state.249 These corporations also enjoy preferred jurisdictional status 
over comparable state corporations, which are considered citizens of 
two states and are thus able to invoke diversity jurisdiction in fewer 
situations. The remainder of federal corporations faces greater ambi-
guity; these corporations may not qualify for diversity jurisdiction at 
all, depending upon whether the court considers their activities to be 
sufficiently “localized.” 
 In this Part, I argue that federal business corporations should be 
on equal jurisdictional footing with their state counterparts; there is 
no reason for federal business corporations to be treated differently, 
either better or worse, than state corporations when it comes to 
access to federal court. Additionally, there is no reason that some 
federal business corporations should be treated more favorably than 
others—the situation that exists under the current patchwork of fed-
eral statutes and case law. However, it would be wrong for the courts 
to attempt a judicial solution to the current disparities. It was wrong 
for courts to create a localization exception in the first place when 
Congress had not provided for state citizenship for federal corpora-
tions. Attempting to expand upon that exception would not eliminate 
the disparities that currently exist.250 Therefore, Congress should ad-
dress the current disparities through the enactment of a single, uni-
versal statute that would place all federal business corporations on 
equal jurisdictional footing with state corporations. 
A.   Federally Chartered Business Corporations Should Receive Equal 
Jurisdictional Treatment with Their State Counterparts 
 In considering whether jurisdictional parity between state and 
federal corporations is a desirable goal, it is helpful to start by re-
viewing why federal jurisdiction exists in the first place. Most cases 
reach federal court on one of two jurisdictional bases: either federal 
question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. The rationales for 
these two types of jurisdiction differ, but both focus on the supposed-
ly “better” treatment that certain issues or parties may receive in 
federal court. 
                                                                                                                    
 249. These statutes also use varying formulations. Some statutes refer to the state in 
which the corporation is “located,” while others refer to the state in which the corporation 
has its “home office” or “principal office.” And, still others specifically declare that the cor-
poration shall be deemed a citizen of a particular state or of the District of Columbia. See 
supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. 
 250. The localization rule, no matter how broadly applied, will never lead to true pari-
ty. The localization rule does not embrace a federal corporation that conducts activities na-
tionwide. See supra Part IV.B.3-4. To recognize citizenship for such a corporation, the 
courts would have to employ an entirely different rule, such as the “principal place of busi-
ness” rule that defines state corporate citizenship. 
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 The justifications for federal question jurisdiction are relatively 
straightforward: “At a minimum, no one questions a government’s 
ability to create courts to enforce its laws.”251 Other justifications fo-
cus on what Professor Chemerinsky characterizes as “distrust of the 
state courts”252—a fear that state courts, for a variety of reasons, are 
not equal to the task of interpreting and applying federal law. Addi-
tionally, federal question jurisdiction is often justified by the argued 
need for “uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.”253
 In contrast, the justifications for diversity jurisdiction have never 
been entirely clear.254 Traditionally, diversity jurisdiction has been 
justified by the argument that out-of-state residents may face bias in 
state courts or at least rationally fear that such bias might exist.255
Although other theories have been offered—some, for example, have 
argued that diversity jurisdiction was created to protect business in-
terests from “populist” state legislatures and courts256—the “bias or 
fear of bias” justification remains the most frequently stated.257 For 
many years a debate has raged between those who believe that the 
                                                                                                                    
 251. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 271. 
 252. Id. As an example, Professor Chemerinsky quotes a report of the American Law 
Institute, which argued that federal question jurisdiction should exist “ ‘to protect litigants 
relying on federal law from the danger that the state courts will not properly apply that 
law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy.’ ” Id. (quoting AM. LAW INST.,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 168 
(1969)). However, as Professor Chemerinsky points out, this justification tends to conflict 
with the widely held belief, often asserted in other contexts, that state courts are just as 
able and willing to protect federal rights. See id. at 271-72. 
 253. Id. at 272. Some have questioned, though, whether federal question jurisdiction 
necessarily leads to greater uniformity. Id. (“On a controversial issue, there are likely to be 
two or three different positions adopted among the thirteen federal courts of appeals. Even 
if all fifty state judiciaries consider the issue, there still are likely to be just two or three 
different positions taken on a given legal question.”).  
 254. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 144 (“[N]either the debates of the Consti-
tutional Convention nor the records of the First Congress shed any substantial light on 
why diversity jurisdiction was granted by the Constitution or why the First Congress exer-
cised its option to vest such jurisdiction.”). 
 255. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 296 (summarizing theories regarding initial 
justifications for diversity jurisdiction); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3601, 
at 337-43 (same). In a famous quote, Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer 
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is 
not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this 
subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of 
suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controver-
sies . . . between citizens of different states. 
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). 
 256. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 297-98 (summarizing theories of Judge Hen-
ry Friendly and others). 
 257. See id. at 299-300 (discussing arguments made in favor of retaining  
diversity jurisdiction).  
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justifications for diversity jurisdiction no longer exist258 and those 
who argue that diversity jurisdiction should be retained.259 The  
supporters of diversity argue that state court bias against out-of-
staters may still exist and that the mere perception of possible bias 
justifies retaining this form of federal jurisdiction.260 Related argu-
ments focus on whether abolishing diversity would negatively impact 
business investment.261
 As we have seen, at one time all federally chartered corporations 
could invoke federal question jurisdiction based solely on their feder-
al charters.262 That is no longer the case; only corporations in which 
the federal government owns a controlling interest, or other select 
corporations that serve what might be described as “governmental” 
functions, now enjoy this special status.263
 There may be rational reasons to say that all cases to which gov-
ernment corporations are a party may be heard in federal court. The 
Constitution and statutes provide that cases in which the United 
States is a party typically may be heard in federal court264 and, to the 
extent that a government corporation effectively acts as an arm or 
instrumentality of the government, performing functions similar to 
those of a federal agency, similar considerations may exist.265 But 
there is no reason that federal business corporations should qualify 
for federal jurisdiction based solely on their federal charter. There is 
nothing about federal business corporations that makes them more 
deserving of the protection of the federal courts than their state 
counterparts. To the extent that particular cases to which the federal 
                                                                                                                    
 258. See id. at 298-99 (summarizing arguments for abolishing diversity jurisdiction); 
13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3601, at 352-54 (same). 
 259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 299-302 (summarizing arguments why diver-
sity jurisdiction should be retained); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3601, at  
354-63 (same). 
 260. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 299.  
 261. Professors Wright and Kane summarize these arguments: 
The key question is not whether out-of-state investors will in fact receive fair 
treatment from state courts, but whether they think they will. If abolition, or 
significant curtailment, of diversity jurisdiction would give rise to irrational 
fears by investors and inhibit their willingness to invest in different parts of 
the country, then diversity serves a useful purpose and should be retained. 
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 153 (citation omitted). 
 262. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
 264. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies 
to which the United States shall be a Party . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006) (United States 
as plaintiff); id. § 1346 (United States as defendant). 
 265. Cf. Maistrellis, supra note 112, at 784-90 (discussing reasons why federal corpora-
tions may prefer to litigate in federal court). Because this Article primarily focuses on the 
jurisdictional treatment of federal business corporations that serve roles similar to those of 
state-chartered businesses, I will not explore at any length whether the special jurisdic-
tional treatment of governmental corporations is justifiable. 
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business corporation is a party require the application and interpre-
tation of federal law, the corporation, like any other party, can in-
voke federal question jurisdiction on that basis.266 The unique issues 
of federal law that theoretically could arise in any case to which a 
federal corporation is a party—whether the corporation has capacity 
to sue and be sued, has the capacity to enter into contracts, and the 
like—are unlikely to come up as a practical matter.267 And, if these 
issues did come up, they would call for straightforward determina-
tions that are well within the competence of state court judges. 
 While federal business corporations need not and should not re-
ceive preferred access to federal court, they should not be denied that 
access when it would be available to comparable state-chartered cor-
porations. No court or commentator has identified any reason why 
federal corporations should be subject to less favorable jurisdictional 
treatment than their state counterparts. It might be questioned 
whether a large federal business corporation, which conducts activi-
ties nationwide or in a number of states, really has reason to fear 
that it will suffer prejudice or other disfavored treatment if it is 
forced to litigate in the courts of a state in which it conducts business 
activities.268 But if that observation is true, it is equally true for a 
comparable state corporation.269 The current jurisdictional treatment 
of state-chartered corporations is expressly founded on the notion 
that state courts may be biased against corporations that are neither 
chartered in the state nor have their principal places of business in 
the state—or, perhaps more accurately, on the notion that such a 
corporation and its investors may rationally fear that such a bias 
may exist.270 Until Congress rejects the “fear of bias” rationale, either 
                                                                                                                    
 266. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Although I am not aware of any em-
pirical data on point, it may well be that federal corporations are able to invoke federal ju-
risdiction more frequently than state corporations because more of the law regulating their 
operations is federal in nature. 
 267. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 104 (“Once [a] question [of this nature] is 
settled, it is of course unlikely that it would be raised in subsequent cases . . . .”). 
 268. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, it is difficult to measure empirically whether ac-
tual bias does exist. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 300. Most studies have focused on 
whether fear of bias actually influences forum choice; those studies have reached mixed 
conclusions. See id. at 300-01. 
 269. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 146-47 (citing scholars who argue that cor-
porations’ access to diversity jurisdiction should be restricted or eliminated entirely). But 
see Moore & Weckstein, supra note 55, at 1445-51 (offering a spirited defense of preserving 
corporate access to diversity and arguing against further restrictions). This Article need 
not, and does not, take a position in this continuing debate. My argument is only that if 
there are continuing reasons for state-chartered corporations to be able to invoke diversity 
jurisdiction, those reasons apply no less fully to federally chartered business corporations. 
 270. The legislative history of § 1332(c)(1) speaks of diversity jurisdiction as “having 
been established . . . to provide a separate forum for out-of-State citizens against the pre-
judices of local courts and local juries by making available to them the benefits and safe-
guards of the Federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102. The legislation sought only to address “the evil whereby a local 
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by eliminating diversity jurisdiction altogether or by limiting state 
corporations’ access to diversity,271 federal business corporations 
should be able to invoke diversity jurisdiction on equal terms.272
B.   The Federal Courts Should Not Take It upon Themselves to 
Expand the Localization Exception 
 Although this Article advocates leveling the jurisdictional playing 
field for federal business corporations, this change should not be ac-
complished through the courts. The courts never should have recog-
nized the exception in the first place when Congress had not acted to 
adopt a comprehensive definition of citizenship for federal corpora-
tions. Even if a limited exception were proper, the policy of strict con-
struction of diversity jurisdiction should counsel against expanding 
the exception absent clear congressional intent. 
 Again, it may be helpful to begin this part of the discussion with a 
review of basic principles regarding federal jurisdiction. Federal 
courts are, by their very nature, courts of limited jurisdiction.273 The 
Constitution defines the outer limits of federal jurisdiction, and Con-
gress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction that exceeds those lim-
its.274 Moreover, it is generally accepted that, because the Constitu-
tion leaves it to Congress whether to create lower federal courts or 
not, lower federal court jurisdiction does not exist unless Congress 
acts to confer that jurisdiction. The courts may not confer their own 
jurisdiction or expand their jurisdiction beyond the limits that Con-
gress has imposed.275
 Because federal jurisdiction is limited, there is a presumption 
against federal court jurisdiction276 and a party who wishes to invoke 
jurisdiction has the burden of showing that it exists under the cir-
                                                                                                                    
institution, engaged in a local business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to 
bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate char-
ter from another State.” Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3101-02. 
 271. It appears unlikely that in the near future Congress will further restrict corpora-
tions’ access to diversity jurisdiction. Few specific proposals have been made in recent 
years, and past proposals (discussed supra at note 73) “were heavily attacked and no long-
er figure significantly in the diversity debate.” WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 148. 
 272. It is worth noting that Chief Justice Marshall’s famous statement about the justi-
fication for diversity jurisdiction was made in the context of a case involving the citizen-
ship of the Bank of the United States, a federally chartered corporation. See supra note 
255. He specifically noted that “citizens of different states, are not less susceptible of these 
apprehensions, nor can they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision, 
because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name.” Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 
(5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). 
 273. See generally Lund, supra note 31, at 108-11 (discussing limited nature of federal 
jurisdiction and the constraints that guide federal courts as they interpret statutes that 
govern diversity jurisdiction). 
 274. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 212-15. 
 275. See id. at 197-98, 266-67; 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3601, at 343. 
 276. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 267. 
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cumstances of the particular case.277 These general observations have 
special bearing when jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizen-
ship, where the federal courts are called upon to interpret and apply 
state law. State courts have the primary responsibility and compe-
tence to interpret the state’s statutes and to develop the state’s com-
mon law, and granting federal courts jurisdiction over a state law 
dispute arguably interferes with the role of state courts.278 Because 
decisions about whether and when diversity jurisdiction should exist 
necessarily call for a balancing of competing constitutional inter-
ests—the rights of the states versus concerns about fairness to liti-
gants or similar matters—these decisions are entrusted to Congress, 
the politically accountable branch. Thus, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the constitutional policy of limited jurisdiction re-
quires the federal courts to strictly construe diversity jurisdiction 
statutes.279 As Chief Justice Stone stated, “Due regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal 
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction 
to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”280 This rule of 
strict construction has often been invoked by federal courts when 
they have been called upon to construe congressional grants of diver-
sity jurisdiction.281
                                                                                                                    
 277. Id. at 309; see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 27 (stating that because 
federal courts have only limited jurisdiction “and because it would be not simply wrong but 
indeed an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if those courts 
were to entertain cases not within their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party 
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is with-
in the competence of the federal court”). 
 278. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 267-68 (“[R]estrictions on federal court juris-
diction advance the important values of federalism and separation of powers. For example, 
limiting federal court authority preserves the role of the state courts. Also, constraining 
federal judicial power helps to limit the role of the judiciary in the federal system.”); see al-
so WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 55, at 2 (“[E]xpansion of the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts diminishes the power of the states.”).  
 279. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3602, at 376. 
 280. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (involving interpretation of diversity ju-
risdiction’s amount in controversy requirement); accord, e.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 
442, 446 (1942) (“The policy of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction upon the district 
courts calls for its strict construction.”); Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-
77 (1941) (“These requirements, however technical seeming, must be viewed in the pers-
pective of the constitutional limitations upon the judicial power of the federal courts . . . . 
The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity jurisdic-
tion, is one of jealous restriction, [and] of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness . . . .” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 The policy of strict construction also applies to removal statutes. See, e.g., Iceland 
Seafood Corp. v. Nat’l Consumer Coop. Bank, 285 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(“[T]here exists a policy of strictly construing the removal statute, particularly when based 
upon diversity grounds. This policy is intended to secure state sovereignty by not removing 
cases that properly belong in state court.” (citation omitted)). 
 281. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3602, at 376 n.29 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 2008) 
(citing cases). 
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 Courts, of course, have a proper role in interpreting the general 
jurisdictional rules that Congress has provided.282 But even assuming 
that it was proper for the Court to undertake the task of defining 
state citizenship for state-chartered corporations at a time when 
Congress had provided for jurisdiction in cases between citizens of 
different states but had not actually defined who may qualify as a 
state “citizen,”283 the federal courts should not have asserted a simi-
lar role with regard to federal corporations. State corporations, after 
all, are creatures of state law and thus more naturally qualify for 
state citizenship for jurisdictional purposes. As creatures of federal 
law, it is not at all obvious that federal corporations should qualify to 
be treated as state citizens,284 even for the limited purpose of defining 
the scope of federal jurisdiction.285 It should have been left to Con-
gress to decide whether federal corporations should qualify for this 
status and, if so, on what terms. 
 The Supreme Court made similar points when it refused to extend 
state citizenship treatment to a labor union in United Steelworkers of 
America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.286 The Court recognized the “consider-
able merit” of the argument that it was unfair to treat unincorpo-
rated labor unions differently than state corporations and that the 
force of these arguments was particularly strong because labor un-
ions faced the potential of experiencing prejudice in state courts.287
                                                                                                                    
 282. See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Feder-
al Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52 (2007) (discussing judiciary’s role in interpreting 
federal jurisdictional statutes). 
 283. The Court has referred to the cases in which it attempted to determine when 
state-chartered corporations could qualify for state citizenship as its single foray into defin-
ing citizenship for artificial entities. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 
(1990) (“[H]aving entered the field of diversity policy with regard to artificial entities once 
(and forcefully) in Letson, we have left further adjustments to be made by Congress.”). 
 284. Recall that in Deveaux, the very first case to consider the citizenship of a federally 
chartered corporation, the Court declared that a corporation “is certainly not a citizen.” 
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 86 (1809). Later, in Bankers Trust, the 
Court reiterated that a federal corporation “is not a citizen of any state.” Bankers Trust Co. 
v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 309 (1916). 
 285. It might even be questioned whether it is constitutional to treat a federal corpora-
tion as a state citizen. Cf. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 
(1949) (holding that it was constitutional for Congress to treat citizens of District of Co-
lumbia as state citizens, though the Court cannot agree on rationale). The point is likely of 
no practical consequence as long as Osborn remains good law, however, because under Os-
born, Congress can constitutionally provide for federal question jurisdiction over any case 
to which a federal corporation is a party. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. 
 286. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). 
 287. Id. at 149-50; see also id. at 150 (“Extending diversity jurisdiction to unions, says 
petitioner, would make available the advantages of federal procedure, Article III judges 
less exposed to local pressures than their state court counterparts, juries selected from 
wider geographical areas, review in appellate courts reflecting a multistate perspective, 
and more effective review by this Court.”). 
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Nevertheless, “these arguments, however appealing, are addressed to 
an inappropriate forum”:288
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to 
the status of corporations for diversity purposes, how such citizen-
ship is to be determined, and what if any related rules ought  
to apply, are decisions which we believe suited to the legislative 
and not the judicial branch, regardless of our views as to the  
intrinsic merits of petitioner’s argument—merits stoutly attested 
by widespread support for the recognition of labor unions as juridi-
cal personalities.289
 These points have similar bearing when we consider the jurisdic-
tional status of federally chartered corporations. It is not at all ob-
vious that federal corporations should be regarded as state citizens, 
and that policy decision should have been left to Congress. Moreover, 
the difficulties that the federal courts have experienced in attempt-
ing to formulate a clear test for federal corporate citizenship illu-
strate that Congress might have been better suited to undertaking 
that task, if Congress thought it appropriate to do so. 
 Moreover, the argument for judicial restraint applies particularly 
strongly here because Congress arguably has made an election not to 
treat certain federally chartered corporations as state citizens. Recall 
that Congress repealed automatic federal question jurisdiction in 
stages. Congress first repealed automatic federal question jurisdic-
tion for national banks, replacing it with a statute that defined na-
tional banks’ citizenship for purposes of diversity.290 Later, Congress 
repealed automatic federal question jurisdiction for railroads,291 and 
eventually for all other federally chartered corporations,292 without 
making any provision regarding diversity jurisdiction. Although 
Congress later enacted statutes that defined state citizenship for cer-
tain other federal corporations,293 Congress has never provided a 
general definition of citizenship for all federal corporations as it did 
for state corporations through the enactment of § 1332(c)(1). 
                                                                                                                    
 288. Id.; see also id. at 147 (“[W]e believe this properly a matter for legislative consid-
eration which cannot adequately or appropriately be dealt with by this Court.”). 
 289. Id. at 153. The Court emphasized the difficulties that would be involved in fa-
shioning a test for a labor union’s citizenship, compared with state corporations, for which 
the state of incorporation was “a natural candidate.” See id. at 152. The Court expressed 
similar concerns in a later decision, concluding that the issue of whether limited partner-
ships should be recognized as state citizens in the same manner as corporations was best 
left to Congress to decide, not to the courts. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185,  
197 (1990). 
 290. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
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 There are two possible conclusions we can draw from this legisla-
tive history. The first is that by enacting § 1348 and similar statutes, 
in which Congress has defined state citizenship with regard to na-
tional banks and certain other categories of federal corporations, 
Congress has expressed a general policy in favor of placing federal 
corporations on similar jurisdictional footing with state corporations. 
Therefore, it has been proper for courts to attempt to effectuate that 
congressional policy, as they have done by creating and expanding 
the localization rule. The second possible conclusion is exactly the 
opposite: that Congress, by defining state citizenship for some federal 
corporations but not for others, has expressed a legislative policy that 
only certain federal corporations should qualify for diversity jurisdic-
tion, therefore making it inappropriate for courts to act contrary to 
that policy.294 Because it is impossible to say for sure which of these 
is the case, the federal courts, mindful both of the limited nature of 
federal jurisdiction and of their own limited role in expanding that 
jurisdiction, should have recognized that it was inappropriate to 
create a rule that had the effect of expanding federal jurisdiction. 
 Moreover, even if courts had been justified in recognizing a li-
mited localization rule, the prudential considerations discussed 
above counsel in favor of strictly confining this judicially created ex-
ception to federal corporations whose activities truly are “localized” 
in a single state.295 The great disparity in the results achieved in the 
localization cases illustrate the policy-based considerations that must 
be resolved in determining when and how the rule should apply to 
federal corporations that engage in multistate or nationwide activi-
ties—policy determinations more appropriately left to Congress.296
                                                                                                                    
 294. Of course, a third, equally plausible conclusion is that the particular statutes 
Congress has enacted have been in response to lobbying efforts by particular industry 
groups and Congress has not expressed a single, consistent policy in this area. If this is the 
case, I would argue for the same outcome as I do under the second possibility—that the 
courts should exercise judicial restraint and decline to expand the scope of federal jurisdic-
tion through judicial fiat. 
 295. See Harris v. Am. Legion, 162 F. Supp. 700, 711 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (citing policy of 
strict construction of diversity jurisdiction and refusing to extend localization exception to 
federal corporation that conducted activities in more than one state); see also Commercial 
Fed. Bank v. Dorado Network Sys. Corp., No. 8:05CV391, 2005 WL 2218421, at *5 (D. Neb. 
Sept. 13, 2005) (“This court is not . . . vested with the authority to rewrite federal statutes 
and thereby correct perceived inconsistencies or redefine its jurisdiction based on public 
policy arguments. This court’s jurisdiction is defined by Congress. In the context of state 
law claims, such as the breach of contract action at issue in this case, the Constitution re-
serves to the states the power to provide for the determination of controversies in  
their courts.”). 
 296. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1990) (stating that determi-
nation of what types of business entities qualify as “citizens” and the test to be used to de-
termine citizenship involve policy judgments best left “to the people’s elected representatives”). 
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C.   Congress Should Adopt a Single Statute Defining the Citizenship 
of Federal Business Corporations 
 In the preceding sections, I have argued that federal business cor-
porations should enjoy jurisdictional parity with state corporations. 
But I have also argued that it was inappropriate for the courts to ju-
dicially create the localization rule or to expand that rule beyond its 
origins. I have similarly pointed out that the localization rule has 
been applied inconsistently by the courts and that even the most ex-
pansive application of the rule leaves some federal corporations at a 
jurisdictional disadvantage, with no access to diversity jurisdiction.297
Moreover, the scattered statutory provisions that Congress has 
adopted, defining state citizenship for some classes of federal corpo-
rations, are inconsistent and have led some federal corporations to be 
treated more favorably than comparable state corporations.298
 The best way to resolve the current jurisdictional morass is for 
Congress to adopt a single jurisdictional statute to govern all federal-
ly chartered business corporations. The jurisdictional status of feder-
al corporations is already partially addressed in § 1349, which pro-
vides that federal jurisdiction does not exist simply on the basis of 
the corporation’s federal charter.299 Congress could simply add a 
second sentence to that statute, providing that “[f]or purposes of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction, a corporation incorporated by or under an 
Act of Congress shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which its 
main office is located and of the State in which it has its principal 
place of business.”300
 A single statute would have numerous advantages over the scat-
tered jurisdictional provisions that currently exist at various loca-
tions in the U.S. Code.301 As we have seen, those statutes use varying 
                                                                                                                    
 297. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra Part IV.B.5. 
 299. The statute presently provides the following: “The district courts shall not have 
jurisdiction of any civil action by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was 
incorporated by or under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more 
than one-half of its capital stock.” 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006). 
 300. This language is similar to that found in legislation currently pending before Con-
gress, which would authorize federal chartering of insurance companies and agencies. See
National Insurance Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1880, § 302(a), 111th Cong. (2009) 
(“[F]or purposes of jurisdiction, a national insurer or national insurance agency shall be 
deemed a citizen of the State in which its main office is located and of the State in which it 
has its principal place of business.”); see also National Insurance Act of 2007, H.R. 3200, § 
1201(f)(4), 110th Cong. (2007) (similar language); S. 40, § 1201(f)(4), 110th Cong. (2007) 
(similar language). The word “States” is already defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (2006) to in-
clude U.S. territories, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
 301. My proposed statute is intended to replace § 1348, § 1464(x), and the other miscel-
laneous statutes that currently define state citizenship for certain groups of federal corpo-
rations. My statute is, in a certain sense, overinclusive; its definition of state citizenship 
would apply not only to federal business corporations, which are most in need of this statu-
tory clarification, but also to government corporations that can already invoke federal ju-
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language, resulting in varying and inconsistent applications.302 An al-
ternative to my proposal would be to go back, locate all of the scat-
tered statutes, and modify them to contain consistent language, 
while also adding consistent language to the federal chartering sta-
tutes that currently contain no jurisdictional provisions.303 But there 
is much to be said for a single rule located in Title 28 of the U.S. 
Code, which is the place where we expect to find provisions relating 
to federal jurisdiction. Congress would no longer need to ensure that 
it added a jurisdictional provision every time it authorized the char-
tering of a new type of federal corporation. 
 A single, central rule should also result in greater consistency in 
the interpretation of the statutory language. The proposed language 
should not present any unique interpretative difficulties. Courts 
have a long history of interpreting and applying the phrase “princip-
al place of business” in the context of state-chartered corporations,304
and the phrase should apply equally well to federal corporations. 
Moreover, the “main office” language already is used in relation to 
several types of federal corporations;305 to the extent the language 
currently is not used in reference to certain federal corporations, it 
should not be especially difficult for the courts to determine what 
should qualify as the corporation’s main office. 
 To ensure the greatest possible jurisdictional parity with state 
corporations, it is important that the statute include both the state in 
which the corporation has its main office and the state in which it 
has its principal place of business. The current statutes define feder-
al corporations as citizens of only a single state—either the state in 
which the corporation has its “home office” or “principal office,” or the 
state in which the corporation is “located”—with the result that some 
federal corporations enjoy greater federal court access than an iden-
tical state corporation would enjoy.306 It may be impossible to create 
exact jurisdictional congruence between federal and state corpora-
                                                                                                                    
risdiction under either § 1349’s government ownership proviso or under one of the specific 
statutes discussed supra at notes 110-14 and accompanying text. I do not see this redun-
dancy as a problem, however. Moreover, at least some government corporations would like-
ly be better off if this statute is enacted. See supra note 113 (discussing Fannie Mae and 
other government corporations that may not be able to invoke federal question jurisdiction 
based solely on their federal charter). 
 302. See supra Part IV.B.5. 
 303. For example, the statutes governing federal credit unions include no provision re-
garding federal jurisdiction. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795k (2006). 
 304. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The courts have not always agreed on 
the test to be used in determining a state corporation’s “principal place of business.” There 
is no reason to expect, however, that extending the test to federally chartered corporations 
would lead to any greater variations in the interpretation than now exist. 
 305. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 30(b)-(c) (2006) (national banks); id. § 1467a (savings and 
loan holding companies); id. § 1817(a)(4) (FDIC-insured depository institutions); id. § 
1841(o)(4) (bank holding companies). 
 306. See supra Part IV.B.5. 
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tions, as the concept of a state of incorporation has no application to 
federal corporations, but the “main office” language serves as a close 
analogy and should lead to the same result in most cases. 
VII.   CONCLUSION
 It has now been many decades since Congress eliminated auto-
matic federal question jurisdiction for most federal business corpora-
tions. The decision to take that step was well justified; there is no 
reason that a federal business corporation, functionally identical to a 
state corporation in every respect, should be able to invoke federal 
jurisdiction simply because of its federal charter. 
 But Congress should have also taken the opportunity to clarify 
whether federal corporations may qualify for diversity jurisdiction 
and, if so, under what circumstances. Because Congress failed  
to take this step, the courts were asked to make these policy judg-
ments for themselves. The result, the judicially-created localization 
rule, is an amorphous rule that not surprisingly has led to inconsis-
tent application.  
 When Congress has acted, it has done so in a piecemeal manner, 
addressing only particular types of federal corporations. The statutes 
that Congress has adopted throughout the years use varying defini-
tions for corporate citizenship, and they do not place federal corpora-
tions on jurisdictional par with their state counterparts. 
 The statutory solution that I propose in this Article would resolve, 
in a comprehensive manner, many of the current inconsistencies and 
inequities. It would provide a single statutory definition of federal 
corporate citizenship that would create jurisdictional parity between 
state and federal corporations in most situations. Although there 
would undoubtedly be interpretative issues to resolve, these issues 
should prove no more difficult than the issues that the courts  
currently address when considering the citizenship of state- 
chartered corporations. 
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